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ARTICLES

Masking Copyright Decisionmaking:
The Meaninglessness of Substantial
Similarity
Amy B. Cohen*

Traditionally courts have placed great weight on the issue of substan
tial similarity in adjudicating copyright infringement lawsuits. Once ac
cess is proven, a court will usually find infringement if the works are
viscerally determined to be substantially similar. This Article criticizes
the traditional approach as failing adequately to distinguish copying
from misappropriation, failing adequately to distinguish ideas from ex
pression, failing to provide adequate guidelines for determining misap
propriation, and as overlapping with fair use determinations. The Arti
cle also criticizes variations on the traditional approach imposed by the
Third and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeal as not remedying the tradi
tional approach's fundamental shortcomings.
The Article proposes replacing the substantial similarity test with fair
use considerations. Such an approach would force courts to elucidate
their reasons for determining infringement, and thus would promote con
sistency and predictability.

What factors are appropriate to consider in determining whether one
work infringes the copyright in another work? Assume that one party

* Assistant Professor of Law, Western New England College School of Law; J.D.,
Harvard Law School, 1978; B.A., Connecticut College, 197 4. The author wishes to
express her appreciation to her colleagues, Joseph J. Basile, Jr. and Arthur D. Wolf,
for the encouragement and helpful comments they provided during the preparation of
this Article.
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has obtained a copyright on a stuffed toy cat that has an oversized head
with oversized purple eyes, large purple ears, a Cheshire grin, and a
distinctive rainbow plaid fabric covering. 1 Assume also that a second
manufacturer markets a stuffed toy cat with an ordinary size head and
ordinary size purple eyes, purple ears, no grin, but the same distinctive
rainbow plaid fabric covering. In other words, the two works differ in
head and eye sizes and in the presence of the grin, but use the same
colors in the eyes, ears, and fabric covering. Does the second cat in
fringe the copyright in the first? Under current copyright law as devel
oped in the cases and in the Copyright Act of 197 6, there is no reliable
way to predict an answer to that question, because neither Congress
nor the courts have articulated the substantive basis used to determine
if one work infringes the copyright in another.
The Copyright Act of 197 6 specifically provides copyright owners
with a right to sue for infringement. 2 It also provides several remedies, 3
but neither the statute nor its legislative history clearly defines the sub
stantive showing a plaintiff must make to establish that a party has
infringed the copyright. The statute simply states that anyone who "vi
olates any of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner as provided by
sections 106 through 118" is liable for copyright infringement. 4 When
1

For purposes of this discussion, it is assumed that the work in question is validly
copyrighted. A discussion of the question of copyrightability and originality is beyond
the scope of this Article. For a discussion of those issues, see generally 1 M. NIMMER,
NIMMER ON CoPYRIGHT§§ 2.01, 2.03 (1985).
2 See Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 501(b) (1982) [hereafter 1976 Act]. The
1976 Act provides the owner of any of the exclusive rights with a right to sue for
infringement of the particular right or rights belonging to that party. Thus, exclusive
licensees as well as those who own the entire copyright have a right to sue under
§ 501(b). See, e.g., Eden Toys, Inc. v. Florelee Undergarment Co., 697 F.2d 27 (2d
Cir. 1982). See generally 3 M. NIMMt:R, supra note 1, § 12.02.
3 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 502 (injunctions), 503 (impounding infringing articles), 504
(statutory or actual damages and profits of infringer), 505 (costs and attorney's fees)
(1982).
4
17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (1982). Section 106 of the 1976 Act enumerates five exclusive
rights provided to the copyright owner. Specifically, they are the right
( 1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the
public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or
lending;
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual work, to perform
the copyrighted work publicly; and
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
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the actual work itself is reproduced, distributed, publicly performed or
publicly displayed by the alleged infringer, this definition of infringe
ment is sufficiently clear. Interpretation difficulties arise when the
copyright owner complains that the alleged infringer has used a work
not identical to the protected work, but, as in our toy cat hypothetical,
has used portions or variations of the protected work.
The legislative history of section 106 of the 1976 Act reveals Con
gress' intent that a work need not be reproduced in its entirety to con
stitute copyright infringement:
[AI copyrighted work would be infringed by reproducing it in whole or in
any substantial part, and by duplicating it exactly or by imitation or sim
ulation. Wide departures or variations from the copyrighted works would
still be an infringement as long as the author's 'expression' rather than
merely the author's 'ideas' are taken. 5

This language does not indicate just how wide those departures and
variations can be and still infringe the copyright. For example, are the
differences in head and eye size and the absence of the Cheshire grin
too wide for the second cat to infringe the copyright on the first?
The ambiguity surrounding the right to prepare a derivative work
exacerbates the confusion generated by this loose definition of "repro
ducing." The Copyright Act of 1976 defines a derivative work in part
as a "work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a trans
lation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion
picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, conden
sation, or any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed,
or adapted." 6 Because section 106(2) of the statute provides the copy
right owner with the exclusive right to prepare derivative works, any
one who prepares a derivative work without permission is liable for
copyright infringement. Again, what is left unclear is how much of the
protected work the second work must use for it to be an infringing
derivative work. The legislative history indicates only that "the infring
ing work must incorporate a portion of the copyrighted work in some
pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the in
dividual images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display
the copyrighted work publicly.
/d. § I 06. Sections I 07 through 118 then impose certain statutory limitations on those
exclusive rights, including the limitations created for fair use ( § 107), library reproduc
tion (§ 108), certain nonprofit performances (§ I 10), and others.
5 H.R. Rt:P. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 61 (1976); S. Rt:P. No. 94-473,
94th Cong., 1st Sess. 58 (1975) (emphasis added).
6
17 u.s.c. § 101 (1982).
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form." 7
The failure of Congress to address completely the issue of what con
stitutes infringement would be less troubling if the case law enunciated
an adequate standard. However, as we will see, no such enunciation
exists. The courts have used a "substantial similarity" test to determine
infringement. 8 This test judges whether, in the eyes of the ordinary ob
server, there is a substantial similarity between the protected work and
the allegedly infringing work. In other words, the second toy cat cannot
infringe the copyright in the first cat unless a lay observer would con
sider the two cats to be "substantially similar." Understanding how to
define copyright infringement requires knowing how courts determine
substantial similarity.
Many commentators have observed, however, that there is no general
agreement as to the exact meaning of "substantial similarity." 9 It is a
7

H.R. Rt:l'. No. 94-1476, supra note 5, at 62; S. Rt:l'. No. 94-473, supra note 5,
at 58 (emphasis added). The 1976 /\ct also created an issue as to whether an alleged
infringer violates an exclusive right by performing or displaying publicly not the actual
work, but a work that is either a "reproduction," as defined in the legislative history, or
a "derivative work." Although the language of§§ 106(4) and 106(5) refers to perform
ances or displays of the "copyrighted work," those rights are presumably also violated
when the work that is performed or displayed is an infringing reproduction or an in
fringing derivative work. The statute defines "display" as "to show a copy," 17 U.S.C.
§ 101 (1982), so presumably as long as that copy is an infringing reproduction, the
display right is violated, even though the actual copyrighted work has not been dis
played. See Burwood Prods. Co. v. Marse! Mirror & Glass Prods., Inc., 468 F. Supp.
1215, 1218 n.S (N.D. Ill. 1979); see also H. Rt:l'. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 64 (1976)
("the right of public display applies to original works of art as well as to reproductions
of them") (emphasis added). /\s noted, supra text accompanying note 5, a reproduction
need not be of the entire work to infringe the copyright. Furthermore, if the defendant
performs a work, the performance will violate the § 106( 4) exclusive right of perform
ance even if the defendant has not produced a physical copy of the work. See Leo Feist,
Inc. v. Demarie, 16 F. Supp. 827 (W.D. La. 1935) (playing copyrighted music by ear
as opposed to from sheet music constitutes infringement). It would thus seem that if
enough of the work has been reproduced in the performance to be considered a substan
tial part, that performance would also infringe the copyright.
8 See infra text accompanying notes 53-56.
9 See, e.g., 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 1, § 13.03[/\[; Fleming, Substantial Similar
ity: Where Plots Really Thicken, 19 CoPYRIGHT L. SvMI'. (/\SC/\P) 252, 262 (197 1)
("This nebulous area of similarity is the heart of copyright law, and no doubt it is the
most evasive part."); Knowles & Palmieri, Dissecting Krofft: An Expression of New
Ideas in Copyright?, 8 SAN Ft:RN. V.L. Rt:v. 109, 117 (1980) ("elusive element for
establishing copyright infringement"); Comment, Copyright Fair Use - Case Law
and Legislation, 1969 DuKt: L.J. 73, 81-86 [hereafter Comment, Fair Use] (existence
of various approaches to defining substantial similarity noted); Note, Copyright:
Hollywood v. Substantial Similarity, 32 OKLA. L. Rt:v. 177, 178 (1979) [hereafter
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phrase that, instead of becoming more understood with each judicial
interpretation, has become more ambiguous. Although some have writ
ten off this problem as inherent in copyright matters, 10 it is a problem
with obvious causes and possible solutions. More importantly, it is a
problem that has resulted in jurisprudential confusion.
The purpose of this Article is to reduce the confusion surrounding
determinations of infringement by proposing a new approach for decid
ing copyright infringement. However, it is first necessary to understand
how the current tests evolved and how they are Hawed. Part I of this
Article traces the historical development of the tests for infringement
from the nineteenth century through the early twentieth century to the
pivotal opinions in Arnstein v. Porter 11 and Ideal Toy Corp. v. Fab-Lu
Ltd. 12 In these cases, the Second Circuit defined what will be referred
to as the "traditional" approach to determining copyright infringement.
Part II discusses how courts currently apply the traditional approach,
and particularly focuses on substantial similarity as the keystone of that
approach. The part also discusses how some courts have attempted to
improve the tests while still relying on the principle of substantial simi
larity. Finally, part III proposes a new approach that narrows the con
cept of substantial similarity to a more objective, predictable principle.
This approach would force courts to articulate their reasons for decid
ing whether a particular defendant is liable for copyright infringement,
thus making more predictable how much borrowing will constitute
infringement.

I.

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT

One of the most persistent problems in defining copyright infringe
ment has been determining the proper context for evaluating the simi
larities between works. In one context, courts use similarities as evi
dence tending to support an inference that the defendant saw and
copied from the copyrighted works. In that context, courts look for the
Note, Hollywood] (legal phrase "substantial similarity" has "spawned numerous
tests"); Note, Copyright Infringement Actions: The Proper Role for Audience Reac
tions in Determining Substantial Similarity, 54 S. CAt.. L. Rt:v. 385 (1981) [hereafter
Note, Infringement] ("no complete definition has emanated from the courts"); Note,
Substantial Similarity Between Video Games: An Old Copyright Problem in a New
Medium, 36 VAN!>. L. Rt:v. 1277, 1290 (1983) [hereafter Note, Video Games] (courts
disagree about "the proper method of analyzing this issue").
10 See, e.g., Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d
Cir. 1960) ("[t]he test for infringement of a copyright is of necessity vague").
11 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946).
12 360 F.2d 1021 (2d Cir. 1966).
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type and extent of similarities that are relevant to the likelihood of in
dependent creation by the defendant. In the other context, courts evalu
ate the type and extent of similarities more on the basis of economic or
aesthetic value to determine if the defendant has appropriated too much
of the protected work in creating its work. In that context, courts are
determining misappropriation, not simply copying. In other words, two
ways exist to evaluate the similarities between two works: one as an
evidentiary tool used to infer copying, the other as a substantive test of
liability. Unfortunately, courts have often confused these two contexts
in using the label "substantial similarity." Tracing the historical roots
of the copyright infringement standards reveals the evolution of this
confusing duality.

A.

Nineteenth Century Infringement Standards

In the nineteenth century, courts deciding copyright infringement
claims focused on three separate issues. First, the issue of copying: Did
the defendant use the plaintiffs work, or did she create the second work
independently? Second, the issue of misappropriation: If the defendant
did use the plaintiffs work, did that use appropriate enough of the
plaintiffs work to justify liability? Finally, the issue of fair use: Did
the defendant in good faith use plaintiffs work to create a new, inde
pendent, creative work entitled to protection as a fair use?
1.

Proof of Copying

The first issue, copying, was the primary concern of many courts. In
Emerson v. Davies, 13 the author of an arithmetic textbook claimed that
the defendant had copied tables from the plaintiffs textbook and had
arranged them in a way that made defendant's arithmetic textbook ap
pear similar to the plaintiffs book. The court held that for plaintiff to
succeed, he had to show not only that the defendant had seen the plain
tiffs book, but that "the resemblances in those parts and pages are so
close, so full, so uniform, so striking, as fairly to lead to the conclusion
that the one is a substantial copy of the other, or mainly borrowed
from it. In short, that there is a substantial identity between them." 14
Taken alone, this passage might seem to indicate that the court re
quired the plaintiff to show that defendant had copied a substantial
portion of the protected work in a quantitative, economic, or aesthetic
sense. However, a further reading of the case indicates that the court
13
14

8 F. Cas. 615 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No. 4436).
/d. at 622 (emphasis added).
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required "substantial identity" only to determine whether the defend
ant had used the plaintifPs work in creating his own. As the court ob
served: "[T]he real question on this point is, not whether such resem
blances exist, but whether these resemblances are purely accidental and
undesigned, and unborrowed, because arising from common sources ac
cessible to both the authors." 15 If the defendant, using public domain
common sources, produced a book that coincidentally was similar to the
plaintifPs book, he did not infringe the copyright. If, however, the simi
larities were "too exact, and various, to have been wholly accidental,"
then a jury could conclude that the defendant had produced his book
not by independent research, but by copying from the plaintifPs book. 16
Thus, the "substantial" in "substantial copy" and "substantial iden
tity" referred to a degree of similarity that was probative of copying,
not a determination that what defendant had copied was substantial in
a quantitative, economic, or aesthetic sense.
Similarly, in Greene v. Bishop, 17 the court again compared two text
books, this time English grammar studies, and found infringement de
spite the defendant's argument that its book did not use the language of
the plaintiff, but only "expresses and condenses [his] views .... " 18 The
court reasoned:
Copying is not confined to literal repetition, but includes, also, the various
modes in which the matter of any publication may be adopted, imitated, or
transferred, with more or less colorable alterations to disguise the piracy.
In all such cases ... the main question is, whether the author of the work
alleged to be a piracy has resorted to the original sources alike open to him
and to all writers, or whether he has adopted and used the plan of the
work which it is alleged he has infringed, without resorting to the other
sources from which he had a right to borrow. 19

A person thus infringed a copyright by using the protected work in
stead of doing independent work. The focus was not principally on how
much or what aspects of the plaintifPs work defendant had borrowed,
but on whether defendant had copied the plaintifPs work rather than
doing his own work. The concern was with whether "the labors of the
/d. at 625.
/d.; see also Drury v. Ewing, 7 F. Cas. 1113, 1116 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1862) (No.
4095) ("the true inquiry undoubtedly is, not whether the one is a facsimile of the other,
but whether there is such a substantial identity as fairly to justify the inference that in
getting up the guide, Mrs. Ewing has availed herself of Mrs. Drury's chart and has
borrowed from it its essential characteristics");
17
10 F. Cas. 1128 (C.C.D. Mass. 1858) (No. 5763).
18 /d. at 1130.
19
/d. at 1134 (emphasis added).
11

16
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original author are substantially to an injurious extent appropriated by
another." 20 The similarities between the works were thus relevant to
determine if the defendant had in fact used the plaintiffs work.
The emphasis placed on the question of independent creation by the
defendant was most obvious in nonfiction works such as those at issue
in Emerson and Greene. Even in fictional works, however, courts fo
cused on whether the defendant had copied from the plaintiff or inde
pendently created an original composition. For example, in Daly v.
Palmer, 21 the plaintiff and the defendant each used what today would
be considered a rather cliched railroad rescue scene in their otherwise
different plays. 22 The court held the defendant liable because the "sub
stantial identity between the two scenes would naturally lead to the
conclusion, that the later one had been adapted from the earlier one." 23
The court concluded:
The true test of whether there is a piracy or not, is to ascertain whether
there is a servile or evasive imitation of the plaintifrs work, or whether
there is a bona fide original compilation, made up from common materi
als, and common sources, with resemblances which are merely accidental,
or result from the nature of the subject.Z 4

This court was thus also using the term "substantial identity" to re
fer to a type of similarity that would be relevant in determining the
likelihood of independent work by the defendant. Because the court
concluded that the defendant did not independently create that scene in
the play but copied from the plaintiffs play, it held the defendant lia
ble. Thus, the initial issue in determining infringement was whether
the similarities between the works resulted from copying by the defend
ant. The court used the adjective "substantial" to signify a degree or
type of similarity that would be relevant in proving that issue.
2.

Misappropriation

Already confused in determinations of infringement, however, was
the quite different question of whether the defendant had copied
enough of the plaintiffs work to be held liable. As Judge Story ob
served, the distinctions in copyright law even then were "subtile and
20

/d.

6 F. Cas. 1132 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1868) (No. 3552).
The scene depicted the intended victim tied to railroad tracks and then having the
victim pulled from the tracks just before the train's arrival. /d. at 1133.
23 /d. at 1138 (emphasis added).
24 /d.
2•

22
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refined, and, sometimes, almost evanescent." 25 However, courts recog
nized that it was "certainly not necessary, to constitute an invasion of
copyright, that the whole of a work should be copied, or even a large
portion of it, in form or in substance." 26
If what was copied was small in amount but of substantial value to
the copyright owner's work, then the defendant could be liable for
copyright infringement. 27 For example, in Daly2 8 the plaintiff alleged
that the copied railroad scene was very important to the attraction and
success of the plaintifrs play, even though it was only one scene. The
court concluded that copying of even just a part of the copyrighted
work was actionable. 29 The adjective "substantial" in this context re-:
ferred to the economic or aesthetic significance of what the defendant
had copied. 30
25

Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 344 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901).
Id. at 348.
27 See Story v. Holcombe, 23 F. Cas. 171, 173 (C.C.D. Ohio 1847) (No. 13,497)
(infringement "does not depend so much upon the length of the extracts as upon their
value"); Gray v. Russell, 10 F. Cas. 1035, 1038 (C.C.D. Mass. 1839) (No. 5728) (in
finding defendant liable for infringing plaintifrs copyright in his Latin grammar text,
court observed that focus "is not so much on the quantity as of the value of the selected
materials"); Folsom, 9 F. Cas. at 348 (infringement does not "necessarily depend on
the quantity taken," but also on "the value of the materials taken").
28 6 F. Cas. 1132 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1868) (No. 3552).
29 See id. at 1133, 1138. In discussing the allegedly similar scene in the two different
plays, the court observed that the defendant's use of the scene would be a piracy if that
scene, "although performed by new and different characters, using different language,
is recognized by the spectator . . . as conveying substantially the same impressions to,
and exciting the same emotions in, the mind, in the same sequence or order." /d. at
1138. This passage has often been cited in support of the spectator test for copyright
infringement, i.e., that a work is not an infringement of a protected work unless the
ordinary observer would see them as substantially the same. In fact, however, this pas
sage is only dicta relating to the separate issue of whether copyright extended to protect
the idea of this scene when the dialogue, the setting, and the rest of the story differed.
The Daly court concluded that it did if the scene itself conveyed the same impressions
and emotions to the audience. The court's principal focus on similarities, however, re
lated to the question of independent creation, discussed supra in text accompanying
notes 21-24. Daly thus is weak support for the notion that there is no infringement
unless the entire works are seen as substantially similar by the ordinary observer. The
case is better read as looking for sufficient similarities to infer copying. See also Note,
Hollywood, supra note 9, at 180 ("spectator test" is merely dicta in Daly opinion).
30 See Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (C.D.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901) (in
fringement may exist "if so much is taken, that . . . the labors of the original author
are substantially to an injurious extent appropriated by another") (emphasis added);
Daly, 6 F. Cas. at 1138 (a work "conveying substantially the same impressions" 1s
piracy of another) (emphasis added).
26
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Fair Use

Even if a plaintiff established enough copying to state a claim against
the defendant, the courts permitted the defendant to assert the defense
of fair use or fair "abridgement." To be a permitted abridgement, the
second work had to condense substantially the content of the protected
work, had to have been done in good faith, and had to be itself a new
work that was the product of the defendant's own intellectual labor and
judgment. 31 The degree of similarity between the two works was also
one of several factors considered in determining the broader equitable
defense of fair use. The fair use doctrine also considered the type of
work involved and the way that the defendant had used that work. 32
Thus, each of the three general issues considered in the nineteenth
century - independent creation, misappropriation, and fair use - re
quired considering the extent of similarity between the two works.
Moreover, the adjective "substantial" was often used in evaluating the
extent of similarity in each of these contexts.

B.

Changes in the Early Twentieth Century

In the early twentieth century, the tests for infringement began to
change. Courts began to place several more specific burdens on copy
right plaintiffs. First, the plaintiff had to prove that the defendant had
access to the protected work. Courts also began regularly to force plain
tiffs to confront the issue of whether what the defendant had copied
was copyrightable subject matter. Finally, the plaintiff specifically had
to prove substantial similarity as a determinant of substantive liability.
1.

Access

Although some courts had, in earlier cases, mentioned circumstances
indicating that the defendant had been exposed to the plaintiffs work, 33
31

Story v. Holcombe, 23 F. Cas. 171, 173-75 (C.C.D. Ohio 1847) (No. 13,497)
(fair abridgment must involve "real substantial condensation of the materials and intel
lectual labor and judgment bestowed thereon"); Folsom, 9 F. Cas. at 347-49 (copying
entire letters of George Washington, not just "abbreviated or select passages," is not
fair abridgment).
32 See, e.g., Lawrence v. Dana, 15 F. Cas. 26, 58-62 (C.C.D. Mass. 1869) (No.
8136) (privilege of fair use extends only to uses that "will not cause substantial injury
. . . where the amount copied is small and of little value, if there is no proof of bad
motive"). See generally W. PATRY, THF. FAIR Ust: PRIVII.F.GF. IN CoPYRIGHT LAw
18-64 (1985 ).
33
For example, in Daly, 6 F. Cas. at 1133-34, the plaintiff alleged that his play was
well known and that the defendant had procured a copy of the play. The court did not,
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in the 1920's and 1930's courts began to require that the plaintiff show
more than similarities between the two works to prove copying: the
plaintiff also had to show that the defendant had seen, or at least had
had an opportunity to see, the plaintifrs workY By 1940, this require
ment had evolved into the principle that is now a key part of the tradi
tional approach to determining copyright infringement: the plaintiff
must prove that the defendant had access to the protected work. Al
though some dispute still exists as to whether the plaintiff must prove
actual access or only opportunity for access, courts generally agree that
showing some possibility of access is very much a part of the plaintifrs
case. 35
however, discuss these allegations' relevance. Similarly, in Emerson, 8 F. Cas. at 621,
the court reasoned:
[A]s the book of Emerson was published in 1829, and had a wide circula
tion, and that of Davies was not published until 1840, the natural infer
ence certainly is, that, composing a book on the same subject, for the same
professed object . . . he should . . . have examined all the existing works
published and on sale in the neighboring states upon the same subject.
However, access was not critical according to the court, since the defendant could have
seen the plaintiffs work but still compiled his own from other sources. This further
demonstrates the nineteenth century's overriding concern with independent creation.
See supra text accompanying notes 13-24.
34 The earliest case found that explicitly required a showing of access was Simonton
v. Gordon, 12 F.2d 116 (S.D.N.Y. 1925), involving a claim that the defendant's play
had infringed plaintiffs novel. The court held:
[A) play may· fairly be subjected to a charge of piracy, if a substantial
number of its incidents, scenes and episodes are, in detail, arrangement,
and combination, so nearly identical with those to be found in a book, to
which the author has access, as to exclude all reasonable possibility of
chance coincidence, and lead inevitably to the conclusion that they were
taken from the book.
/d. at 120 (emphasis added). By the mid-1930's, courts were regularly referring to the
element of access as a part of the plaintiffs case distinct from the element of substantial
similarity. See, e.g., Deutsch v. Arnold, 98 F.2d 686, 688 (2d Cir. 1938); Wilkie v.
Santly Bros., 91 F.2d 978, 979 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 735 (1937); Arnstein v.
Edward B. Marks Music Corp., 82 F.2d 275, 276 (2d Cir. 1936); Caruthers v. R.K.O.
Radio Pictures, Inc., 20 F. Supp. 906, 907 (S.D.N.Y. 1937); Hirsch v. Paramount
Pictures, Inc., 17 F. Supp. 816, 817 (S.D. Cal. 1937); Echevarria v. Warner Bros.
Pictures, 12 F. Supp. 632, 638, 639 (S.D. Cal. 1935).
35 Compare, e.g., Schwarz v. Universal Pictures Co., 85 F. Supp. 270 (S.D. Cal.
1945) (access not established if no proof that protected work was actually seen by party
creating allegedly infringing work) with Smith v. Little, Brown & Co., 245 F. Supp.
451 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), affd, 360 F.2d 928 (2d Cir. 1966) (evidence of opportunity to
see protected work is sufficient to establish access); see also Selle v. Gibb, 741 F.2d 896,
901 (7th Cir. 1984) (must be evidence sufficient to infer reasonable possibility of ac
cess); 3 M. NIMM•:R, supra note 1, § 13.02[A).
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The Idea/Expression Dichotomy

More significantly, at about the same time courts began consistently
to address whether the defendant had copied protected material and not
simply uncopyrightable materials. This required the courts to consider
whether a defendant had copied simply uncopyrightable ideas or the
plaintifrs protected expression. In Dymow v. Bolton, 36 the defendant
used a love plot similar to that used by the plaintiff in his play, but the
defendant set his play in the theatre industry instead of the garment
industry, which the plaintiff had used. The court concluded that even if
the defendant had copied the plot from the plaintifrs play, he took
nothing copyrightable since copyright does not protect ideas and funda
mental plots.
With Judge Learned Hand's famous pronouncement in 1930 in
Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp. regarding the vague line between
protectable expression and unprotectable idea, 37 the dichotomy between
expression and idea became an increasingly important issue in copyAn exception to this requirement does exist, however, if the similarities between the
two works are so striking that there could be no other possible explanation for those
similarities but that the defendant had access to and copied the plaintifrs work. See,
e.g., Association of Am. Medical Colleges v. Mikaelian, 571 F. Supp. 144, 150-51
(E.D. Pa. 1983), affd mem., 734 F.2d 3 (3d Cir. 1984) (similarities in test questions
"preclude the possibility of independent creation"); see also Ferguson v. National
Broadcasting Co., 584 F.2d ttl, 113 (5th Cir. 1978) (insufficient evidence of striking
similarity to support summary judgment for plaintiff); Heim v. Universal Pictures Co.,
154 F.2d 480, 488 (2d Cir. 1946) (although not found in case at bar, "copying might
be demonstrated, with no proof or weak proof of access, by showing that a single brief
phrase, contained in both pieces (of music], was so idiosyncratic in its treatment as to
preclude coincidence"); Stratchborneo v. Arc Music Corp., 357 F. Supp. 1393, 1403
(S.D.N.Y. 1973) (striking similarity, which requires demonstration "that such similari
ties are of a kind that can only be explained by copying, rather than by coincidence,
independent creation, or prior common source," not proven in case at bar). But see
Selle v. Gibb, 741 F.2d 896, 901 (7th Cir. 1984) (must be at least minimal evidence
supporting reasonable possibility of access); see also 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 1, §
13.02(8).
36 It F.2d 690 (2d Cir. 1926).
37 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930):
Upon any work, and especially upon a play, a great number of pat
terns, of increasing generality will fit equally well, as more and more of
the incident is left out. The last may perhaps be no more than the most
general statement of what the play is about, and at times might consist
only of its title; but there is a point in this series of abstractions where
they are no longer protected, since otherwise the playwright could prevent
the use of his 'ideas,' to which, apart from their expression, his property is
never extended.

HeinOnline -- 20 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 730 1986-1987

Copyright

1987]

731

right cases. 38 The expanded importance of that principle reduced the
significance of the independent creation issue because it recognized that
defendants were allowed to copy some aspects of a copyright owner's
work. If the defendant copied ideas rather than expression, the defend
ant was not liable. 39
3.

Misappropriation

Courts also altered the focus in infringement litigation by requiring
the plaintiff to show that the defendant had created a work that the
ordinary observer would consider a misappropriation of the copyrighted
work. Although case authority for this notion dates back at least to
Daly, 40 the Second Circuit explicitly made this requirement a regular
part of proving copyright infringement in Arnstein v. Porter. 41 In that
case the plaintiff alleged that the defendant, Cole Porter, had infringed
the copyright in several musical compositions created and copyrighted
by the plaintiff. The court outlined a two-part test for copyright in
fringement: whether there was copying, and if so, whether "the copying
. . . went so far as to constitute improper appropriation." 42 In making
the first determination, the trier of fact would examine evidence of ac
cess and similarity: "Of course, if there are no similarities, no amount
of evidence of access will suffice to prove copying. If there is evidence of
access and similarities exist, then the trier of fact must determine
whether the similarities are sufficient to prove copying." 43 To evaluate
competently the likelihood of copying, expert testimony and analysis
would be admissible. 44 Thus, the first part of the Arnstein test focused
38

In the Copyright Act of 1976, Congress made this principle part of the statutory
law by excluding from the subject matter of copyright "any idea, procedure, process,
system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery." 17 U .S.C. § 102(b)
( 1982).
9
3 See, e.g., Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954) (copyright extends to particu
lar form of plaintiffs statuettes, but not to idea of using statuette of human figures as
lamp base); Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 109 (1879) (copyright protects author's ex
planation of bookkeeping method, but not method itself); Nichols v. Universal Pictures
Corp., 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930) (copyright on play does not extend to basic idea of
lovers of different backgrounds and parental disapproval of their relationship).
40
6 F. Cas. 1132 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1868) (No. 3552); see supra note 29.
41
154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946).
42 /d. at 468.
43 /d.
44
/d. Such analysis was particularly important for musical works. As the Second
Circuit observed in Darrell v. Joe Morris Music Co., 113 F.2d 80, 80 (2d Cir. 1940):
"[W]hile there are an enormous number of possible permutations of the musical notes
of the scale, only a few are pleasing; and much fewer still suit the infantile demands of
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simply on the issue of independent creation.
The second part of the Arnstein test was in some ways a departure
from earlier definitions of infringement. The court said that even if the
plaintiff established copying by evidence of access and similarities prop
erly dissected and analyzed, it is still necessary to determine whether
that copying went so far as to constitute improper appropriation. This
second test was related to the nineteenth century concern with the value
of what the defendant had copied. 45 The court, however, now applied a
test based on the subjective reactions of lay observers: "On that issue
. . . the test is the response of the ordinary lay hearer" 46 as to
"whether defendant took from plaintifrs works so much of what is
pleasing to the ears of lay listeners, who comprise the audience for
whom such popular music is composed, that defendant wrongfully ap
propriated something which belongs to the plaintiff." 47 The court fur
ther held that expert testimony, detailed analysis, and careful dissection
were not a proper basis for determining misappropriation:
The proper criterion on [the misappropriation] issue is not an analytic or
other comparison of the respective musical compositions as they appear on
paper or in the judgment of trained musicians . . . . The impression
made on the refined ears of musical experts or their views as to the musi
cal excellence of plaintifrs or defendant's works are utterly immaterial on
the issue of misappropriation; for views of such persons are caviar to the
general-and the plaintifrs and defendant's compositions are not caviar. 48

The trier of fact was thus left to depend upon some visceral reaction
as the basis for determining misappropriation. Copyright infringement
hinged on whether an ordinary observer would conclude that the de
fendant had copied too much of the plaintifrs material. Instead of using
some objective standards or criteria based on economic impact or quan
tity, courts were to determine infringement on an unpredictable, im
pressionistic basis.
The Second Circuit exacerbated this test's ambiguity in 1966 when it
the popular ear. Recurrence is not therefore an inevitable badge of plagiarism." There
fore, even though the two songs at issue in Darrell both included the same eight-note
sequence several times such that it constituted a significant part of each song, the court
concluded that this was not enough evidence to infer copying, given the commonness of
that eight-note sequence. In other words, the similarity was not substantial enough to
infer copying, given what experts could state about the possible universe of pleasing
melodies and the likelihood in that context that any two composers might independently
invent the same musical sequence.
45 See supra text accompanying notes 27-30.
46
Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 468.
47
/d. at 473.
48 /d.
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decided Ideal Toy Corp. v. Fab-Lu Ltd. 49 Although the Second Circuit
in Arnstein 50 had separated the issue of copying from the issue of mis
appropriation, in Ideal Toy Corp. the court effectively abandoned that
separation. In that case the plaintiff claimed that the defendant had
infringed the copyrights in two of plaintiffs dolls. The plaintiff re
quested a preliminary injunction against the defendant's manufacture
and sale of the accused dolls. The district court denied the plaintiffs
request, finding that the defendant's dolls did not misappropriate the
expression in the plaintiffs dolls. According to the district court, "the
total effect of the image conveyed to an ordinary observer by the ac
cused dolls is quite distinct from that of plaintiffs dolls." 51 On appeal,
the plaintiff argued that the district court had erred by relying on the
misappropriation requirement incorrectly imposed on plaintiffs in Arn
stein.52 That is, the plaintiff seemingly argued that the court should
abandon the second element of the Arnstein test, which required a
showing of misappropriation in addition to a showing of copying.
In response to this argument, the Second Circuit stated first that
proof of copyright infringement required a showing of "substantial sim
ilarity" between the two works, and that "substantial similarity" was
present when "an average lay observer would recognize the alleged
copy as having been appropriated from the copyrighted work." 53 In
other words, the ordinary observer's determination that the two works
were substantially similar was to be based on that observer's determi
nation that the defendant had copied from the plaintiff. The court then
said that the element of misappropriation identified in Arnstein "was
merely an alternative way of formulating the issue of substantial simi
larity . . . although the use of the term 'improper appropriation' some
what obscures the issue. " 54 Thus, instead of conducting two separate
inquiries into the works' similarities, first to establish copying and then
to determine misappropriation, the court indicated that there need be
just one determination of "substantial similarity" based on whether an
ordinary observer could detect copying. If copying was so detectable,
49

360 F.2d 1021 (2d Cir. 1966}.
154 F.2d 464.
51 Ideal Toy Corp. v. Fab-Lu Ltd., 266 F. Supp. 755, 756 (S.D.N.Y. 1965}, affd,
360 F.2d 1021 (2d Cir. 1966).
52 See Ideal Toy Corp., 360 F.2d at 1023 n.2.
53 /d. at 1022. Although the phrase "substantial similarity" had been used earlier,
see, e.g., Comptone Co. v. Rayex Corp., 251 F.2d 487 (2d Cir. 1958), it was in Ideal
Toy Corp. v. Fab-Lu Ltd. that the court first defined that phrase in connection with
the ordinary observer test.
54
Ideal Toy Corp., 360 F.2d at 1023 n.2.
50
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then the defendant had misappropriated as well.
By combining the issues of copying and misappropriation, 55 the Sec
ond Circuit reduced the infringement test to, first, proof of access and,
second, substantial similarity to the ordinary observer. This test is re
ferred to hereafter as the "traditional approach" to copyright
infringement. 56
55 See Ideal Toy Corp. v. Kenner Prods. Div. of General Mills Fun Group, Inc.,
443 F. Supp. 291, 303 n.11 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (the two steps of the Arnstein process
"seem to have merged into the single lay-observer test for substantial similarity an
nounced in Ideal Toy Corp. v. Fab-Lu Ltd. (Inc.)" (citation omitted)).
56 In Walker v. Time Life Films, Inc., 784 F.2d 44 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 106
S. Ct. Rptr. 2278 (1986), the Second Circuit seemed to recognize the need to restore a
bifurcated analysis of copying and misappropriation. In describing the plaintiffs bur
den of proof, the court, citing Arnstein and other decisions, held that the plaintiff
"must show that his book was 'copied,' by proving access and substantial similarity
between the works, and also show that his expression was 'improperly appropriated,'
by proving that the similarities relate to copyrightable material." Walker, 784 F.2d at
48. This bifurcation is in fact quite different from and, at first glance, an improvement
over the Arnstein approach. The court seemed to be saying that evidence of access and
substantial similarity would be used to determine the issue of copying, not misappropri
ation. The second element of the plaintiffs claim would not be misappropriation in the
traditional sense, i.e., copying of too much of what was valuable in the plaintiffs work,
but rather would require only a showing that what the defendant had copied was pro
tectable expression. Such an approach is similar to that proposed in this Article, and
would greatly improve the copyright decisionmaking process for the reasons described
herein. See infra text accompanying notes 135-56.
In fact, however, the Second Circuit did not go quite so far and the copyright deci
sionmaking process remains quite muddy. Later in its opinion, in discussing the ques
tion of whether expert analysis is admissible to prove substantial similarity, the court
restates its earlier bifurcated test. First, the plaintiff must show copying and then "'il
licit copying' . . . which demands that such similarities relate to protectible [sic] mate
rial." Walker, 784 F.2d at 51. The court then quotes the language from Arnstein pro
viding that on the first issue expert analysis and dissection are admissible, but that on
the second issue, the test is the response of the lay observer, and dissection is irrelevant.
/d. This seems inconsistent. If the second test is a determination of whether what was
copied was protectable expression, then dissection seems critical; the response of the lay
observer would be irrelevant. The court nowhere explains this inconsistency.
Moreover, its application of this bifurcated test in the case before it is not instructive.
The defendant's evidence of expert analysis consisted of an affidavit from a literary
expert demonstrating how the plot, themes, structure, pace, and character of the de
fendant's film differed from the plaintiffs book. The court used this evidence in con
cluding that all that the defendant had copied from the plaintiffs book was un
copyrightable facts and ideas. Thus, it was used to determine if "illicit copying" had
occurred. This is the second prong of Arnstein, which considers such dissection inap
propriate. /d. at 52. The court thus seems to be clinging to Arnstein in words only, not
in application.
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THE ROLE OF SUBSTANTIAL SIMILARITY IN CURRENT TESTS
FOR INFRINGEMENT

As discussed above, in the first half of the twentieth century, courts
combined two of the three copyright infringement issues addressed sep
arately in nineteenth century cases. In the nineteenth century, courts
separately considered the issues of copying, misappropriation, and fair
useY By relying on the concept of "substantial similarity" as deter
mined by an ordinary observer, the Second Circuit in Ideal Toy v. Fab
Lu Ltd. 58 confused the issue of copying with that of misappropriation.
The confusion of these two issues had many undesirable consequences,
as is shown by examining the way more recent courts have used "sub
stantial similarity" in determining infringement.

A.

The Traditional Approach

The principal difficulty with the traditional approach 59 is not the is
sue of access, but rather the way courts use the concept of substantial
similarity. At least four problems plague the concept of substantial sim
ilarity as used in the traditional test for copyright infringement. First, it
fails to separate the issue of copying from the issue of misappropriation.
Second, it ineptly deals with the dichotomy between idea and expres
sion by obscuring that legal principle in determinations that eschew
dissection and analysis. Third, it nowhere indicates how to determine
how much similarity is too much. Thus, it leaves the courts with an ad
hoc, subjective approach that is not workable or fair. Finally, combin
ing the test with the fair use doctrine as currently defined causes courts
to consider the degree of similarity between the works twice when the
fair use defense is asserted, resulting in an inefficient use of the courts'
time.
1.

The Failure to Distinguish Copying from Misappropriation

Several cases involving alleged infringement of the copyright in fabric
patterns illustrate the traditional approach's obscuring of the issue of
whether the similarities between two works support an inference of
copying. In Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 60 the Sec
ond Circuit concluded, in comparing two fabric patterns and finding a
likelihood of infringement, that the "ordinary observer, unless he set
57

5s
59
60

See supra text accompanying notes 13-32.
360 F.2d 1021 (2d Cir. 1966).
See supra text accompanying notes SS-56.
274 F.2d 487 (2d Cir. 1960).
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out to detect the disparities, would be disposed to overlook them, and
regard their aesthetic appeal as the same." 61 The opinion in Peter Pan
Fabrics, written in 1960, predated Ideal Toy Corp., in which the Sec
ond Circuit defined "substantial similarity" as whether the ordinary
observer would be able to detect copying. By contrast, Peter Pan
Fabrics focused simply on the overall aesthetic appeal to the ordinary
observer. The issue of copying was a separate concern. In three fabric
design cases decided after I deal Toy Corp., however, the court merged
the ordinary observer test as used to gauge overall aesthetic appeal with
the definition of substantial similarity as detectable copying with unde
sirable results. Now the determination of copying was based simply on
the overall aesthetic appeal to the ordinary observer.
For example, in Novelty Textile Mills v. Joan Fabrics Corp., 62 the
court quoted both the Peter Pan Fabrics "aesthetic appeal" test and
the Ideal Toy Corp. "detectable copying" test in its definition of sub
stantial similarity, without commenting on the differences between
them. The defendant admitted access to the copyrighted fabric pattern,
but claimed that it did not copy the pattern in creating its own pattern.
Without ever analyzing the similarities to determine either the likeli
hood of such independent creation or the likelihood of copying, the
court simply concluded that to lay eyes, the fabrics were "almost identi
cal,"63 and that therefore the defendant had infringed the plaintiffs
copyright.
Similarly, in two district court decisions, the courts relied on the Pe
ter Pan Fabrics formulation of the ordinary observer test in concluding
that the fabrics at issue were substantially similar. That is, in the
courts' views, the fabrics would have the same overall effect and would
appear identical or almost identical to the ordinary observer. 64 Again,
the courts conducted no separate analysis of the similarities to support
the inference of copying. 65 Many basic fabric patterns, including floral
/d. at 489 (preliminary injunction affirmed).
558 F.2d 1090, 1093 (2d Cir. 1977).
63 /d.
64 See Kenbrooke Fabrics, Inc. v. Holland Fabrics, Inc., 602 F. Supp. 151, 154
(S.D.N.Y. 1984); Lauratex Textile Corp. v. Allton Knitting Mills, Inc., 517 F. Supp.
900, 902-03 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
65 In Kenbrooke Fabrics, 602 F. Supp. at 154-55, the defendant unsuccessfully at
tempted to prove independent creation by introducing rebuttal evidence. Copyright law
generally provides that once the plaintiff demonstrates access and substantial similarity,
a presumption of copying by the defendant arises. The burden then shifts to allow the
defendant to rebut that presumption by introducing evidence that would explain how
those similarities occurred if not by copying. Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 650
61

62
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patterns and plaids, existed for hundreds of years. Therefore, it would
arguably have been appropriate for the courts to have considered the
likelihood that the defendants created their designs independently or by
using common public domain sources rather than the plaintiffs' works.
By relying upon the ordinary observer test alone and thus rejecting
dissection, analysis, and expert testimony, the courts were deprived of
the evidence necessary to analyze properly the likelihood of indepen
dent creation. Thus, when the ordinary observer test for substantial
similarity is based on overall aesthetic appeal, as it was in these cases,
courts may overlook the important issue of the likelihood of copying by
the defendant, an issue for which such an ordinary observer test is not
well-suited. 66 Simply because a party had an opportunity to see a proF.2d 1365, 1375 (5th Cir. 1981); John L. Perry Studio, Inc. v. Wernick, 597 F.2d
1308, 1310 (9th Cir. 1979); Granite Music Corp. v. United Artists Corp., 532 F.2d
718,721-24 (9th Cir. 1976); see also Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Toy Loft,
Inc., 684 F.2d 821, 829 (11th Cir. 1982); Kamar lnt'l, Inc. v. Russ Berrie & Co., 657
F.2d 1059, 1062 (9th Cir. 1981); Novelty Textile Mills v. Joan Fabrics Corp., 558
F.2d 1090, 1092 n.2 (2d Cir. 1977). For example, evidence of the use of preexisting
common sources, see Granite Music Corp., 532 F.2d at 720, or of entirely independent
creation, John L. Perry, 597 F.2d at 1309 n.2, would be probative and relevant to this
issue. Although the court in Kenbrooke Fabrics recognized that sometimes such proof
can overcome a finding of copying based on "substantial similarity," the court's finding
of substantial similarity between the fabrics was based on a test that by definition pre
cluded any analysis of the likelihood of copying by the defendant. Since a presumption
of copying arises from a finding of substantial similarity, it would seem logical to define
"substantial similarity" so as to consider factors relevant to the likelihood of copying,
not simply similarity in aesthetic impact. Otherwise, the presumption has no logical
basis and is based on pure conjecture.
66
Furthermore, even if courts were to use the Ideal Toy Corp. v. Fab-Lu Ltd. for
mulation of the ordinary observer test, which asks if the ordinary observer would be
able to tell that the defendant copied from the plaintiff, the test is flawed. Many com
mentators have recognized that the ordinary observer is not really capable of determin
ing if copying has occurred. Professor Nimmer observed that the lay observer's visceral
reactions "may not always prove an accurate guide to ferreting out the existence of
literary theft," 3 M. NIMMER, supra note I, § 13.03(EJ[2], because the ordinary ob
server cannot realistically determine if the defendant's work had to be the result of
copying from the plaintiffs work, as opposed to the result of independent creation.
Thus, Professor Nimmer concludes that the ordinary observer test is not an effective
method to determine copying.
Robert Fuller Fleming also asks, "Why should the ordinary observer be expected to
detect spontaneously and immediately the theft which probably took weeks and months
to disguise?" Fleming, supra note 9, at 275. In discussing the confusion generated
when the substantial similarity test is used to compare two works with similar plots,
Fleming concludes that "[p]erhaps the greatest obstacle to copyright protection of plots
is the wholesale and unrelenting use of the ordinary observer test as the test of similar
ity for the factfinder, along with the use of its corollary, the limitation on expert testi-
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tected work, and produces a work that ordinary observers would see as
mony." !d. at 279. Because infringers can disguise the copying of plots by slight varia
tions in insignificant settings or incidents, an ordinary observer may not be able to
detect that copying has occurred without the assistance of expert testimony. /d. at 275;
see also Sorensen & Sorensen, Re-examining the Traditional Legal Test of Literary
Similarity: A Proposal for Content Analysis, 37 CoRNELl. L.Q. 638, 649 (1952) (pro
posing quantitative content analysis approach to determine "the probability that such
similarity did not occur by chance," rejecting use of emotional reaction of ordinary
observers as means of determining that issue).
Others have specifically criticized the ordinary observer test as a way to detect copy
ing when the sophisticated nature of the copyrighted materials allegedly infringed
makes that test entirely inappropriate. For example, in Whelan Associates, Inc. v. ]as
low Dental Laboratory, Inc., 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct.
877 (1987), the court concluded that the ordinary observer test "is of doubtful value in
cases involving computer programs on account of the programs' complexity and unfa
miliarity to most members of the public." /d. at 1232. The court therefore decided to
"adopt a single substantial similarity inquiry according to which both lay and expert
testimony would be admissible," id. at 1233, in cases involving exceptionally complex
works such as computer programs. See also E.F. Johnson Co. v. Uniden Corp. of Am.,
623 F. Supp. 1485, 1493 (D. Minn. 1985) ("fiction" of ordinary observer test replaced
with an "iterative" approach relying on expert analysis in cases involving infringement
of computer software copyrights). See generally Note, Copyright Infringement of Com
puter Programs: A Modification of the Substantial Similarity Test, 68 MINN. L. REv.
1264 (1984); Note, Defining the Scope of Copyright Protection for Computer Software,
38 STAN. L. REV. 497 (1986).
In fact, those commentators who praise the ordinary observer test and consider it the
most effective way to determine substantial similarity focus not on the use of substantial
similarity as evidence used to establish the existence of copying, but on the use of sub
stantial similarity to determine the substantive issue of misappropriation. For example,
Jeffrey G. Sherman concludes that the lay audience is best suited to determine substan
tial similarity between musical works. Sherman, Musical Copyright Infringement: The
Requirement of Substantial Similarity, 22 CoPYRIGHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 81 ( 1977).
Sherman reasons that because "a certain amount of similarity with previously written
music is statistically impossible to avoid," id. at 124, only the lay audience will be able
to determine if those similarities are substantial enough to justify liability: "The
mechanics of the sequence of notes are not what an audience hears or cares about. If a
composer takes only those aspects of a composition, he has taken nothing of value and
should therefore not be made to pay damages," id. at 135. Thus, Sherman apparently
believes substantial similarity should be used to determine not copying, but
misappropriation.
Similarly, in Note, Infringements, supra note 9, the author proposes that instead of
the average lay observer being the appropriate one to determine substantial similarity,
the specific audience for the particular work should be the focus because the members
of that audience are the ones who provide the copyright owner with the economic in
centive and rewards. The author reasons that since the plaintiff will only be injured if
that specific audience would replace its work with the defendant's copy, it is that audi
ence's view that should be determinative. /d. at 393-94. Again, the focus is on deter
mining misappropriation, not proof of copying. See Knowles & Palmieri, supra note 9,
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substantially the same, should not always raise an inference of copying.
2.

The Failure to Distinguish Ideas from Expression

A second problem with using the standard of substantial similarity as
determined by the ordinary observer as the keystone to copyright in
fringement is that the test inadequately deals with the dichotomy be
tween the uncopyrightable elements of a copyrighted work and copy
rightable expression. This separation is particularly important with
respect to the dichotomy between idea and expression. If the plaintiff is
using substantial similarity as proof of copying, reliance on similarities
in ideas as well as expression may be appropriate, as those similarities
may be probative of the issue of independent creation by the defend
antY However, if the court is considering similarity in ideas to deter
mine misappropriation and thus liability, there is a problem because
those ideas are not protected by copyright and thus cannot be "misap
propriated." The traditional approach casually assumes that the ordi
nary observer is able to keep this dichotomy in mind when determining
whether the aesthetic appeal of the two works is the same.
Consider, for example, the two series of "action figures" at issue in
Mattei, Inc. v. Azrak-Hamway International:
Though the dolls' bodies are very similar, nearly all of the similarity can
be attributed to the fact that both are artist's renderings of the same un
protectable idea - a superhuman muscleman crouching in what since Ne
anderthal times has been a traditional fighting pose. The rendering of

at 141-44 (ordinary observer test should not be used to determine, objectively, likeli
hood of independent creation, but rather should be used to determine, on personalized,
subjective basis, if infringement has occurred); Note, Video Games, supra note 9, at
1310-1 1 (because key issue in infringement is whether public believes two works are
substantially similar, audience test should be used to determine if two video games are
similar with respect to the "play" of game as well as visual and literal expression). All
these commentators see the ordinary observer test as a good method of determining
misappropriation, that is, whether the works are similar enough to cause the plaintiff
harm; their analysis does not relate to the separate and essential question of whether
the defendant copied from the plaintiffs work.
As discussed infra note 71, the ordinary observer test is also not well-suited to deter
mine misappropriation because of the confusion that test creates with respect to the
dichotomy between the protected expression and the unprotected elements of the copy
righted work. Certainly when all three issues are considered at once - copying, misap
propriation, and the scope of protected expression - the ordinary observer test is not
an adequate basis for determining infringement.
67
There would, of course, still need to be a separate finding that some of what was
copied was protected expression. See supra text accompanying notes 36-39 and cases
cited therein.
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such an idea is not in itself protectable; only the particularized expression
of that idea, for example, the particular form created by the decision to
accentuate certain muscle groups relative to others, can be protected ....
In this case a lay observer would recognize certain differences in the way
the two sculptors have created images of strength by overemphasizing cer
tain muscle groups.68

This court's assumptions about the perceptiveness of the lay observer
are probably too generous. After all, the lay observer is not supposed to
be dissecting or analyzing the two works. 69 To expect that observer to
notice which muscle groups are emphasized, in order to see if just ideas
or expression are similar, is obviously inconsistent with the visceral,
generalized approach that the courts prefer. The ordinary observer is
therefore likely to include the unprotected idea - the general notion of
a crouching, muscular man - in determining substantial similarity.
Misappropriation should, however, be determined by looking only at
how that idea is expressed, e.g., which muscle groups are emphasized. 70
The ordinary observer relying upon generalized reactions is not well
suited for that task. 71
68

724 F.2d 357, 360 (2d Cir. 1983) (emphasis added).
See supra text accompanying notes 46-48.
70
See Williams Elec., Inc. v. Bally Mfg. Corp., 568 F. Supp. 1274 (N.D. Ill. 1983)
(only copyrightable elements of pinball games compared in finding no substantial simi
larity); Mosley v. Follett, 1978-81 Copyright L. Rep. (CCH) 1l 25,202 (S.D.N.Y.
1980) (only copyrightable portions of fact-based novel compared in finding no substan
tial similarity).
71 The difficulty of this task is also indicated by the failure of some judges to agree
on how ordinary observers would react in a particular case. For example, in Eden
Toys, Inc. v. Marshall Field & Co., 675 F.2d 498 (2d Cir. 1982), the judges could not
agree as to whether the defendant's snowman doll was substantially similar only in
ideas or also in expression to the plaintiffs copyrighted snowman doll. The defendant's
snowman had a different shaped body (round v. square), different type of hat (large
and shaped v. floppy), different color face (rosy v. white) and scarf (tauersall v. green)
from the plaintiffs doll. The majority affirmed summary judgment in favor of the de
fendant, agreeing with the district judge that the similarities were only those that
"would appear to the ordinary observer to result from the fact that both are snowmen."
/d. at 500. Judge Lumbard dissented because he concluded that the ordinary observer
would overlook the differences and find the dolls similar in expression as well as ideas.
He did not explain, however, how the ordinary observer would separate the expression
from the ideas, nor how he himself had separated them.
Others have recognized the inability of jurors as ordinary observers to separate ideas
from expression. In Bevans v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 329 F. Supp. 601, 604
n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), Judge Tyler criticized the use of the ordinary observer test except
for "comparatively simple fields such as fabrics or clothing designs." In that case the
court compared a play (Stalag 17) and a television program (the Hogan's Heroes pi
lot). The court overturned the verdict in the plaintiffs favor because unprotectable
69
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3. The Failure to Provide Guidelines to Determine Misap
propriation
A third problem with the concept of substantial similarity as used in
the traditional approach to copyright infringement is the inconsistencies
it has created in the determinations of how much similarity in expres
sion is "substantial." There is no objective framework for defining how
much copying is too much.
Some courts emphasize the aesthetic or financial value of the portion
that a defendant has substantially copied. This approach may be
termed the "value" approach. For example, in WPOW, Inc. v. MRLJ
Enterprises, 72 the court compared the defendant's engineering report in
its application to the Federal Communications Commission for con
struction of broadcasting facilities with a report the plaintiff had in
cluded in its application. The court found infringement, reasoning that
ideas had been considered in finding the works substantially similar. Judge Tyler ob
served:
Although the jury was specifically instructed to disregard those similarities
which were virtually necessitated by the use of the same historical setting,
clearly in the public domain, the difficulty of sifting out fur comparison
only the protectible [sic] material is particularly great where, as here, non
protectible [sic] similarities are so pervasive.
/d. at 607.
Professor Gary L. Francione also criticized the ordinary observer test for giving
factfinders too broad a role in determining the dichotomy between unprotected ideas
and facts, and protected expression. He argued that the determination is subsumed in
determinations of substantial similarity. Professor Francione pointed out that this may
create first amendment problems if ideas are in fact given copyright protection as a
result of the "totality approach" to determining copyright infringement. Thus, he
would prefer an approach wherein the determination of what is protected expression
and what is unprotectable idea or fact is determined as a matter of law, not fact. Fran
done, Facing the Nation: The Standards for Copyright, Infringement, and Fair Use
of Factual Works, 134 U. PA. L. R.:v. 519, 557-67 (1986).
Professor Nimmer has also criticized the ordinary observer or audience test, for simi
lar reasons. He recognized that by avoiding dissection and analysis the lay observer will
be unable to distinguish the protected elements from the unprotected elements of the
plaintifrs work. 3M. NIMM~:R, supra note 1, § 13.03[E], at 13-60. Another author has
suggested that the ordinary observer test has led to "sloppy jurisprudence" in which the
courts find copying without distinguishing idea from expression. The author suggests
that this is a particular problem in determining infringement of the copyright in motion
pictures. Because themes are frequently reused in motion pictures, the overall films
could seem similar to a lay observer. The author argues that a test using some analysis
of the works, as well as some recognition of the industry custom of reviving popular
themes, should be adopted to determine substantial similarity between works involving
the motion picture industry. Note, Hollywood, supra note 9, at 181, 187-90.
72 584 F. Supp. 132 (D.D.C. 1984).
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"[ w ]hatever similarities or differences there are in the reports generally,
the critical parts of the reports - the antenna design - are identical.
Taking what is in essence the heart of the work is considered a taking
of a substantial nature, even if what is actually taken is less than
extensive." 73 The court did not focus on the many overall differences
between the two reports. Rather, the court based its finding of substan
tial similarity on· the fact that the defendant had incorporated this one
part, the design, into the report.
The court did not consider whether an ordinary observer would see
the whole report as the same. It looked only at the antenna design, and
because of the importance of that one part and the similarities with
respect to that one part, the court found substantial similarity. 74 Thus,
sometimes the "substantial" in substantial similarity focuses on the im
portance or value of the portion copied, and not on substantiality rela
tive to the overall work.
Other courts focus instead on whether observers will confuse the two
works as a whole and will thus be likely to substitute one for the other.
This approach to determining misappropriation may be termed the
"audience confusion" approach. In those cases, courts consider both dif
ferences and similarities in the works. Differences added by the defend
ants can serve to offset the degree of similarity between the works.
For example, in Novelty Textile Mills, Inc. v. Joan Fabrics Corp., 75
a federal district court had denied preliminary injunctive relief to the
plaintiff, when the plaintiff claimed that the defendant had infringed its
copyright in a fabric design. The district court had found no substantial
similarity because it concluded that the differences would be apparent
to a furniture manufacturer or serious consumer. 76 The Second Circuit
reversed, finding substantial similarity to the ordinary observer, 77 even
though, as pointed out in Judge Mansfield's concurring opinion, there
were several "marked differences" in the dimensions and composition
of the pattern. 78 The determining factor was not the amount taken in
/d. at 136 (emphasis added).
See also Universal City Studios v. Kamar Industries, 1982 CoPYRIGHT L. REP.
(CCH) ~ 25,452 (S.D. Tex. 1982) (holding defendant liable for infringing copyright in
film, E. T. -the Extra-Terrestrial, for using on mugs and pencil holders that it man
ufactured just one actual line from that film, "E.T. Phone Home"); Henry Holt & Co.
v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 23 F. Supp. 302 (E.D. Pa. 1938) (copying of three
_sentences from plaintifPs book not so insubstantial as to justify dismissing complaint).
75
558 F.2d 1090 (2d Cir. 1977).
76 /d. at 1093.
77
See id. at 1094.
78
Id. Judge Mansfield concurred with the majority because he concluded that by
73
74
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absolute or relative terms, but only whether the ordinary observer
would tend to see the two works as the same. 79 In other words, would
creating a fabric using the same colors as well as the same general pattern of plaid, the
defendant had created a fabric that had the same overall effect as the plaintiffs fabric.
See id. at 1095. He thus focused on the overall work and its effect on the consumer. He
differed with some dicta in the majority's opinion, however, in that he concluded that if
someone were to use that plaid with different colors, the effect would not be substan
tially similar. See id. The majority observed that changing the colors would not protect
a defendant from liability for infringement of the design, even though some of those
changes would make the two patterns not appear substantially similar to the ordinary
observer. See id. at 1094 n.6. In the majority's view, if only the pattern of the plaid was
protected, the ordinary observer should compare only that pattern in determining sub
stantial similarity. See id. Such fine distinctions are probably beyond the perceptive
abilities of a lay observer viewing the works without analysis or dissection, just as the
subtle line between idea and expression would often be missed by that ordinary ob
server. See supra note 77.
79
The importance of overall impressions is evident in cases that find no liability
because the defendant, although copying some protected expression, made sufficient
changes so that the works as a whole do not appear substantially similar. See, e.g.,
American Greetings Corp. v. Easter Unlimited, Inc., 579 F. Supp. 607 (S.D.N.Y.
1983) ("cumulative effect" of differences between plaintiffs' and defendant's plush
bears undercuts the similarities between them); Smith v. Weinstein, 578 F. Supp. 1297,
1304 (S.D.N.Y.), affd mem., 738 F.2d 419 (1984) ("Even assuming that [defendant's
screenplay] 'Stir Crazy' was written with the [plaintiffs] script in hand, the 'numerous
differences . . . . undercut substantial similarity.'"). Of course, sometimes the differ
ences do not go far enough to eliminate the overall similarity between the works. See,
e.g., Atari, Inc. v. North Am. Philips Consumer Elec. Corp., 672 F.2d 607 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982) (changes in facial features and colors used in video
games were not enough to avoid liability, as "overall similarities not minute differ
ences" were critical); Ace Novelty Co. v. Superior Toy & Novelty Co., 1984 CoPY
RIGHT L. R~:P. (CCH) ~ 25,656 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (despite minor differences in parties'
bears, they are still "almost indistinguishable"); Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc.
v. The Toy Loft, Inc., 489 F. Supp. 174 (N.D. Ga. 1980), affd, 684 F.2d 821 (lith
Cir. 1982) (introducing differences does not save one from liability for infringement if
works are still substantially similar).
In Warner Bros., Inc. v. American Broadcasting Co., 720 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1983),
the court addressed the significance of differences added by a defendant in using some
parts of a protected work. In that case the defendant's character in its television pro
gram, The Greatest American Hero, allegedly infringed the plaintiffs copyright in the
Superman character, although there were several personality and physical differences
between the two characters. The court observed that differences can undermine the
extent of similarity between works most effectively in visual works where every differ
ence theoretically eliminates a visual similarity (e.g., a change in color or size). See id.
at 241-42. In literary works, differences can be added while theoretically retaining all
the similarities as well (e.g., by adding a paragraph or inserting a chapter). /d. Thus,
even in making overall comparisons, the courts rely on varying standards to determine
the degree of copying that will be permitted, depending on the type of work involved.
See generally Hazen, Contract Principles as a Guide for Protecting Intellectual Prop-
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the defendant's work as a whole be mistaken for or confused with the
plaintiffs work as a whole ?80 Thus, what may be a substantial similar
ity because of value in one case, even though it is only a small part of a
work, may in another case be insubstantial because it is a small amount
and thus the ordinary observer would not see the overall works as the
same. 81
erty Rights in Computer Software: The Limits of Copyright Protection, the Evolving
Concept of Derivative Works, and the Proper Limits of Licensing Arrangements, 20
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 105, 126-27 (1986).
w This concern with audience confusion is also demonstrated in those cases propos
ing that a different test for substantial similarity should be applied where the works at
issue appeal primarily to children, since courts assume that children are less likely than
adults to notice fine distinctions. For example, in considering whether certain lines used
in the defendant's Greatest American Hero television show (e.g., "slower than a speed
ing bullet") infringed the copyright in certain verbal descriptions of the plaintiffs "Su
perman" character, the court, in Warner Bros. v. American Broadcasting Co., 720 F.2d
at 244, found no audience confusion, given the comical tones of the defendant's show
and the timid, bumbling nature of the defendant's character. The court noted, however,
that "[i]f Hero were a children's series, aired on Saturday mornings among the cartoon
programs, we would have greater concern for the risk that lines intended to contrast
Hinckley with Superman might be mistakenly understood to suggest that Hero was a
Superman program." /d.
Similarly, in Atari v. North Am. Philips Consumer Elec. Corp., 672 F.2d 607 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982), the court, in comparing two video games,
noted the importance of the nature of the works and the audiences to which they appeal
in assessing the impact of differences in expression:
Video games, unlike an artist's painting or even other audiovisual works,
appeal to an audience that is fairly undiscriminating insofar as their con
cern about more subtle differences in artistic expression . . . . A person
who is entranced by the play of the game 'would be disposed to overlook'
many of the minor differences in detail and 'regard their aesthetic appeal
as the same.'
/d. at 619 (citation omitted). The court also considered evidence that the defendant's
game was sometimes referred to by the name of the plaintiffs game as probative of
substantial similarity. /d. Thus, again, a principal concern was whether the audience
for the specific works would confuse the defendant's work with the plaintiffs work.
81
The confusion that surrounds the question of how to define "substantial" is well
illustrated by a recent Second Circuit case. In Horgan v. MacMillan, Inc., 789 F.2d
157 (2d Cir. 1986), the plaintiff, executrix of the estate of choreographer George
Balanchine, alleged that the defendant had infringed Balanchine's copyright in the
choreography of The Nutcracker ballet by publishing a book containing still photo
graphs of various scenes from a performance of the ballet. The district court had re
fused to issue a preliminary injunction, finding no likelihood of success on the merits
because the ballet as a performance could not be recreated from the still photographs.
Horgan v. MacMillan, Inc., 621 F. Supp. 1169 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), rev'd, 789 F.2d 157
(2d Cir. 1986). The court of appeals reversed, holding that the district court had ap
plied the wrong standard: "Even a small amount of the original, if it is qualitatively
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The Overlap with Fair Use Determinations

A final problem with the traditional approach to copyright infringe
ment is the confusing overlap it creates with the fair use doctrine. As
significant, may be sufficient to be an infringement, although the full original could not
be recreated from the excerpt." Horgan, 789 F.2d at 162. Thus, the appellate court
adopted a "value" approach, whereas the district court had followed an "audience con
fusion" approach, looking at the total work, not simply the excerpt taken.
Professor Nimmer also recognized that courts used different standards in determining
substantial similarity, depending on whether the works were characterized by "compre
hensive nonliteral similarity" as opposed to "fragmented literal similarity." The former
refers to similarities in the overall structure or pattern of the two works; the latter
describes cases in which specific portions of the two works are identical or nearly iden
tical. In determining if the "comprehensive nonliteral similarity" is substantial enough
to constitute infringement, Professor Nimmer suggests that the courts follow the ap
proach discussed by Professor Chafee. Professor Chafee's approach compares the spe
cific patterns used by the plaintiff and the defendant to see if their works are similar
only in the basic, uncopyrightable level of ideas or whether the defendant has also
taken much of the plaintiffs specific method of developing and expressing that idea. See
Chafee, Reflections on the Law of Copyright: I, 45 Cot.uM. L. REv. 503, 513-14
(1 945}. Professor Nimmer recognizes, however, that courts have been inconsistent in
defining how much similarity in the overall "pattern" is substantial. 3 M. NIMMER,
supra note 1, § 13.03[AJ[ 1], at 13-28, 13-29. This inconsistency stems in part from the
underlying flaw discussed above: The courts do not articulate whether substantial simi
larity in the patterns is relevant for determining copying or for determining misappro
priation. Even if it is clear that the issue is misappropriation, there is no objective or
consistent analytical framework for determining how much of that specific way of de
veloping a pattern must be__;?aken to infringe the copyright.
In "fragmented literal similarity," the defendant's work contains an identical or
nearly identical segment of the plaintiffs expression. Professor Nimmer comments that
in determining if the amount used should be considered substantial, both quantitative
and qualitative factors should be considered. However, ultimately the decision "re
quires a value judgment" reflecting the type of work at issue. 3 M. NIMMER, supra
note I, § 13.03[AJ[2], at 13-39. Again, he defines no structure in which to make that
value judgment. Moreover, this focus on value and quantity would seem to indicate that
only misappropriation and not copying is at issue in cases of "fragmented literal simi
larity;" this is not necessarily true. Even some precise identity in expression may be
coincidental.
Professor Nimmer also comments that ultimately in cases of "fragmented literal simi
larity," it is necessary to consider not simply the extent of similarity, but also, in the
context of the doctrine of fair use, the defendant's purpose in using the plaintiffs ex
pression. 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 1, § 13.03[AJ[2], at 13-35. As discussed infra in
text accompanying notes 136-45, in my view it is much wiser to consider all questions
concerning the value and amount of copying as well as the purpose of the copying in
the context of fair use. Professor Nimmer would apparently continue to have a "misap
propriation" factor considered as part of the plaintiffs case in addition to the fair use
analysis, despite the resulting confusion and duplication.
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noted above, 82 the fair use doctrine has long been available as a defense
to claims of copyright infringement. Although originally a judicially
created doctrine, Congress codified the fair use defense in the 197 6
Copyright Act. Section 107 provides in pertinent part:
In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case
is a fair !!Se the factors to be considered shall include-. . ..
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole . . . .83

Thus, the extent of similarity between the works is one of the factors
considered relevant in determining if a use is fair under the 1976 Act.
The greater the amount of the plaintifrs work that the defendant has
used, the more difficult it will be to prove that use is fair. Thus, after
considering the extent of similarities to determine substantial similarity,
the court must reconsider the extent of similarity between the two
works in weighing the "amount and substantiality" factor of section
107. This unnecessarily duplicates the evidence and unduly confuses
the analysis of similarities. 84
Thus, the use of substantial similarity as determined by the ordinary
observer presents many conceptual and evidentiary problems. Other ap
proaches to determining infringement have evolved, but each has con
ceptual and practical flaws.
See supra text accompanying notes 31-32.
In full, 17 U.S. C. § I 07 ( 1982) provides:
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, the fair use of a copy
righted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or pho
norecords or by any other means specified by that section, for purposes
such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple
copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement
of copyright. In determining whether the use made of a work in any par
ticular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include (1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such
use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational
purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation
to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of
the copyrighted work.
84
Others have criticized this overlap. See Comment, Fair Use, supra note 9, at 7980, 105-06; Note, Infringement, supra note 9, at 395. These critics' views are discussed
in more detail infra at note 143.
82

83

HeinOnline -- 20 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 746 1986-1987

Copyright

1987]

B.

747

The Salkeld Approach

In Universal Athletic Sales Co. v. Salkeld, 85 the Third Circuit modi
fied the traditional test for copyright infringement. In effect, the court
restored the bifurcated analysis described in Arnstein. 86 It held that the
plaintiff alleging copyright infringement first must prove copying and
then "that copying went so far as to constitute improper appropria
tion."87 Because in granting the plaintiffs motion for summary judg
ment the district court made no finding on this second prong, misappro
priation, the appellate court reversed. 88
To determine whether there was improper appropriation, the court
mandated the standard of "whether an ordinary lay observer would de
tect a substantial similarity between the works." 89 As in the traditional
approach, therefore, substantial similarity was the label used to deter
mine both copying and improper appropriation.
The Salkeld test differed, however, in that the court recognized that
"substantial similarity to show that the original work has been copied
is not the same as substantial similarity to prove infringement." 90 How
ever, as in Arnstein, the court indicated that although using expert
analysis and dissection is proper in evaluating similarities to establish
copying, such analysis IS not appropriate for determining
misappropriation. 91
In theory, employing a test based first on an analytical determination
and then on a visceral determination of substantial similarity was an
improvement over the traditional approach. This is because the new
test separated the issues of copying and misappropriation. However, as
applied, this approach failed to clarify adequately the test for infringe
ment, because it failed to resolve the problems caused by relying on the
substantial similarity concept.
1.

Failure to Clarify the Misappropriation Standard

The Salkeld approach still left entirely undefined just how much
similarity would constitute misappropriation. In the Salkeld case itself,
this flaw is obvious. At issue in Salkeld were charts created by both the
plaintiff and the defendant. The two parties manufactured similar ex85

86
87
88
89

90
91

511 F.2d 904 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 863 (1975).
154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946).
Salkeld, 511 F.2d at 907.
See id.
/d.
/d.
See id.

HeinOnline -- 20 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 747 1986-1987

748

University of California, Davis

[Vol. 20:719

ercise machines, and each made a chart using stick figures and textual
material to explain how to use the machines. The appellate court did
not disturb the district court's finding of copying, but found the similar
ities between the two charts insufficient to constitute misappropriation.
We are left without any clear idea as to why this was not enough, or
how much would be enough, because the court commented only:
It is difficult io explain all the points of similarity and dissimilarity be
tween the two charts without going into great detail. . . . [t]he more the
court is led into the finer points of the drawings, the less likely it is to
stand upon the firmer, if more naive, ground of its considered impressions
after its own perusal. 92

In other words, the court was reluctant to give too much guidance be
cause it preferred an entirely visceral basis for determining misap
propriation.
This failure to provide some objective context for defining misappro
priation has left the Third Circuit district courts as confused as those
courts using the traditional approach in determining misappropria
tion.93 For example, in Albert E. Price, Inc. v. Metzner, 94 the court
found substantial similarities between the duck card box manufactured
by the plaintiff and that made by the defendant:
If an average person saw the [plaintiffs] duck card box set at a friends'
[sic] house and then went shopping to purchase such a duck card box, he
or she would probably buy [defendant's product] and not realize that the
duck card box which they had purchased was not the duck card box ad
mired at the friend's house. 95

The court thus seemed to be adhering to the audience confusion ap
proach for determining misappropriation.
On the other hand, in Educational Testing Services v. Katzman, 96
the court seemed more concerned with value than audience confusion.
In that case, the defendant allegedly copied test questions that the
plaintiff had prepared and used in its standardized examinations. The
plaintiff claimed that the defendant used the questions in its prepara
tory course for those examinations. The court found a likelihood of suc
cess on the merits for the plaintiff despite the defendant's claim that
only a "handful of questions out of thousands that [the plaintiff] has
generated" were allegedly copied. 97 The court rejected the argument
92

93
94

95
96
97

/d. at 908-09 (footnote omitted).
See supra text accompanying notes 72-81.
574 F. Supp. 281 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
/d. at 285, 286.
793 F.2d 533 (3d Cir. 1986).
/d. at 542 (quoting brief of Defendants-Appellants, at 25).
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that any copying was de minimis because of the "qualitative signifi
cance" of that copying with respect to the integrity of the plaintiffs
examinations. 98 Thus the court applied the value approach as opposed
to the audience-confusion approach.
2. Failure to Resolve Problems Involving the Idea/Expression
Dichotomy
Not only does the Salkeld approach fail to address the difficulties
caused by determining misappropriation on such a loosely defined, sub
jective basis; it also does not resolve any of the problems existing under
the traditional approach with respect to the idea-expression dichotomy.
The ordinary observer is still left with the impossible task of comparing
only protected expression in determining substantial similarity without
engaging in any thoughtful dissection or analysis of the works.
For example, in Midway Manufacturing Co. v. Bandai-America, 99
the court recognized the two separate uses of substantial similarity to
determine infringement as outlined by the Third Circuit in Salkeld,
and applied the concept to determine both copying and misappropria
tion. The court noted that in determining substantial similarity, consid
ering the idea-expression dichotomy was necessary in deciding the mis
appropriation issue. 100 In applying that principle, the court rejected the
defendant's assertion that the physical characteristics of the characters
appearing in the plaintiffs video game were unprotected ideas: "The
'idea' of any work could always be defined in such detail that the
description of the expression would add nothing to the 'idea,' thus al
lowing a defendant to engage in all but verbatim copying. Such a ploy
cannot be allowed." 101
After engaging in this analysis, however, the court refused to grant
plaintiffs motion for summary judgment. The court held that the issue
of substantial similarity for appropriation purposes is one for a trier of
fact, 102 and that summary judgment was thus only appropriate when
the two works were virtually identical. Thus, ironically, the issue
would still go back to the jury, which would determine substantial sim
ilarity on the basis of the ordinary observer test, a generalized visceral
approach that would not carefully consider the idea-expression
98

/d. at 542-43.
546 F. Supp. 125 (D.N.J. 1982).
11
"' See id. at 139 n.8.
101 Jd. at 148.
1112 See id. at 149.

99
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dichotomy. 103
3.

Failure to Separate Copying from Misappropriation

Even in the area in which it could have improved upon the tradi
tional approach by separating the issues of copying and misappropria
tion, the Salkeld approach remains ineffective. Courts still seem to ad
dress these issues either together in an unfocused way, or by ignoring
one issue while addressing only the other. For example, in Association
of American Medical Colleges v. Mikaelian, 104 based on some verbatim
similarities plus typeface and graphic irregularities that appeared in
both works, the court found that the defendant had copied the plain
tifrs test questions. The court concluded that the defendant took ninety
percent of its questions from the plaintiff. However, the court never
specifically discussed how much of the plaintifrs work the defendant
had copied, or why enough similarities existed to infer not only copy
ing, but also to find misappropriation. Thus, despite the Salkeld out
line of the test for infringement, the court did not specifically address
misappropriation.
On the other hand, in Tompkins Graphics, Inc. v. Zipatone, Inc., 105
the court considered similarities between the parties' art products,
which were arrangements of various shapes and designs. Although the
court recognized that these were common shapes and thus by definition
had to be similar, it made this observation in the context of deciding
whether the defendant had copied too much of the plaintifrs work. The
court noted that only a small proportion of the shapes in the two sets
were exactly the same in dimensions, and thus that the ordinary ob
server would not find any "noteworthy similarity." 106 In other words,
the court jumped to the issue of misappropriation - questioning
whether the defendant copied too much - without making any finding
on the primary question - were there enough similarities to infer cop
ying? Because geometric shapes are common and in the public domain,
only close similarity in arrangement and dimensions would justify con
cluding that the defendant copied rather than independently created its
arrangement. The court's focus on the ordinary observer caused it to
103
See also Custom Decor, Inc. v. Nautical Crafts, Inc., 502 F. Supp. 154, 157
(E.D. Pa. 1980) (two sculptures of duck heads considered substantially similar to ordi
nary observer without any consideration of fact that idea of duck dictates some similari
ties in expression).
Hl4 571 F. Supp. 144 (E.D. Pa. 1983), affd mem., 734 F.2d 3 (3d Cir. 1984).
105 1984 CoPYRIGHT L. Rt:P. (CCH) 11 25,698 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
106 /d. at 19,133.
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miss this issue completely.
Finally, in Klitzner Industries v. H.K. James & Co., 107 the court
granted the plaintiff a preliminary injunction, concluding that the
plaintiff had demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of success on its in
fringement claim. The plaintiff argued that the defendant's advertise
ments for its belt buckles commemorating the Great Seal infringed the
plaintiffs advertisements for its Great Seal commemorative belt buck
les. The court considered several parallel textual passages in the two
advertisements and concluded that the similarities in phrasing, se
quence, and general content were sufficient to support an inference of
copying for purposes of the preliminary injunction motion. 108 The court
recognized that the degree of similarity needed to infer copying was not
necessarily the same as that needed to find misappropriation, 109 but
then muddied its reasoning by finding misappropriation because the
similarities between the advertisements went "beyond mere coincidental
use of descriptive phrases. " 110
The probability of coincidence is relevant, however, to the issue of
copying, since it relates to the likelihood of independent creation. Coin
cidence is irrelevant in deciding if too much has been copied or misap
propriated. The extent of copying is determinative of that issue. Al
though the court did also conclude that the defendant had appropriated
"virtually the entire text and form" 111 of the protected advertisement, its
107

535 F. Supp. 1249 (E.D. Pa. 1982).

108

See id. at 1256-57. For example, the plaintiffs advertisement contained the fol

lowing passage: "Today the eagle continues to soar strong and free over the greatest
nation the world has ever known." /d. at 1255. In a similar location in the textual
sequence of its advertisement, the defendant provided this sentence: "Now two hundred
years later - the eagle continues to soar free and unfettered over the greatest bastion of
freedom the world has ever known." /d. The parallel phrasing, the use of some identi
cal words - "the eagle continues to soar strong and . . . over the greatest . . . the
world has ever known" - and the similar placement in the advertisements are argua
bly enough to infer copying of the text, even though the similar subject matter would
create some similarities absent any copying.
109
See id. at 1256.
110 /d.
111
/d. This conclusion is not inevitable. If we return to the passages quoted above in
note 108, the defendant's use of some different and distinctive words and phrases "Now two hundred years later" instead of "Today," and "unfettered" in addition to
"free," and "bastion of freedom" in place of "nation" - is arguably different enough
to distinguish the two advertisements and avoid audience confusion and also different
enough to conclude that the defendant copied only common words and not what was
truly valuable in the plaintiffs text.
Also, in Whelan Assoc., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc., 609 F. Supp. 1307
(E.D. Pa. 1985), affd, 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 877
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reference to "coincidence" reveals the possibility of some confusion in
the court's reasoning.
4.

Failure to Eliminate the Overlap with Fair Use

Finally, the Salkeld approach does not eliminate the duplication in
considering the extent of similarity between the works, first as part of
determining substantial similarity and then as a factor in determining
fair use. A court must still determine the amount of similarity to deter
mine if copying and misappropriation exist, and then reconsider the
extent of similarity to evaluate the third factor for determining fair use
pursuant to section 107 of the 1976 Act.
Thus, despite the Salkeld approach's potential appeal, it has not re
solved, either in theory or in application, the ambiguities and confusion
troubling determinations of copyright infringement. Using "substantial
similarity" in two different tests only seems to confound the courts even
more than the traditional approach.

C.

The K rofft Approach

In 1977, the Ninth Circuit formulated another approach to deter
mining copyright infringement in Sid & Marty Krofft Television Pro
ductions, Inc. v. McDonald's Corp. 112 The case involved the plaintifPs
children's television show, H. R. Pufnstuf, which was about an imagi
nary land peopled by strange fantasy characters, both good and evil.
The plaintiff claimed that the defendant's McDonaldland advertising
campaign infringed the copyright in H. R. Pufnstup 13 The court first
stated the general outline of a case for copyright infringement: access
(1987), the district court, in comparing two computer programs, failed to apply the
Salkeld bifurcation of the test of substantial similarity first to determine copying and
then misappropriation. After discussing the expert's testimony with respect to the simi
larities, testimony only relevant according to Salkeld to prove copying, the court, with
out explanation, continued by observing that "prospective users and customers at trade
shows found no substantial difference between [the two systems] and considered them to
be the same." /d. at 1322. This observation about audience confusion would be relevant
to the issue of misappropriation, not copying. The district court thus never separately
addressed the issues of copying and misappropriation, and as the Third Circuit ob
served in its review of the district court's decision, "it would thus appear to have con
travened the law of this circuit." Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1232. However, the Third Cir
cuit affirmed by adopting and applying a different test for infringement when computer
programs are at issue. See id. at 488. For a general discussion of computer software
protection, see Hazen, supra note 79.
112 562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977).
113 /d. at 1162.
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and substantial similarity. 114 The defendant did not dispute access, as it
had in fact been negotiating with the plaintiffs for a license to use the
Pufnstuf characters prior to "creating" their own. 115 The court then
went on to discuss the need to show substantial similarity.
The court recognized the flaws with using substantial similarity as
determined by the ordinary observer test, in particular those flaws re
lating to the idea-expression dichotomy. It reasoned that using the ordi
nary observer test to determine substantial similarity without first sepa
rating the idea from the expression "would produce some untenable
results." 116 The plaintiff would be able to protect a simple idea simply
expressed against someone else expressing that idea in an equally sim
ple way. This is the difficulty presented by the Matte[ case involving
the crouching, overdeveloped muscular "action figures." 117 The Ninth
Circuit recognized that the ordinary observer is unlikely to be able to
separate idea from expression in comparing two works without dissec
tion or analysis. Therefore, this test would improperly prohibit others
from copying ideas.
1.

The Extrinsic Test

Although the Ninth Circuit thus recognized at least one of the flaws
in the traditional approach, its attempted resolution was equally
flawed. The court proposed a new two-step test for determining sub
stantial similarity, once the plaintiff had proven access. First, the test
compared the works extrinsically for similarities in ideas. Based on spe
cific criteria, analytic dissection, and expert testimony, the court was to
determine if the ideas in the two works were substantially similar. The
court said that the type of artwork, materials, and setting used were
relevant in applying this extrinsic test. 118
Unfortunately, the court did not have to apply this test in the case
before it, because the defendant conceded that it copied its ideas from
the plaintiff. 119 Moreover, the court did not explain whether determin
ing substantial similarity of ideas was relevant to determining copying
See id.
See id. at 1161.
116 /d. at 1162-63. The example used by the court was a plaster statue of a nude:
"The burden of proof on the plaintiff would be minimal, since most statues of nudes
would in all probability be substantially similar to the [plaintiffs]." /d. at 1163 (foot
note omitted).
11 7 See supm text accompanying notes 68-71.
118 See Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1164.
119
See id. at 1165.
114

115
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or misappropriation or both. A court can compare and analyze ideas to
determine if it can infer copying of those ideas, but determining if ex
pression as well as ideas were copied is still necessary to find copyright
infringement. Thus, a court must also consider expression analytically
to decide if it should infer copying as opposed to independent creation
of that expression. However, as discussed later,1 20 the court rejected us
ing expert testimony and analysis in comparing the expression of those
ideas. Thus, the extrinsic test may help to determine if a defendant has
copied ideas, but the test does not adequately determine copying of pro
tected expression. 121
Examining lower courts' attempts to apply the extrinsic test makes
its problems even more obvious. In Litchfield v. Spielberg, 122 the plain
tiff sued Steven Spielberg, claiming that his film E. T. infringed the
plaintiffs copyright in its musical play Lokey from Maldemar. Like
E. T., the plaintifrs play was about aliens with telekinetic powers who
are temporarily stranded on earth and then become friendly with some
children. Although at some basic level these are substantially similar
ideas, the court looked to the sequence of events, the dialogue, the charSee infra text accompanying note 126.
Professor Nimmer also criticized the Krofft test as an incorrect reading of the first
step of the Arnstein test. Professor Nimmer suggested that by only comparing ideas, the
Krofft test "unnecessarily limited the scope of the court's determination under the pre
liminary, extrinsic test." 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 1, § 13.03[E], at 13-58.
Steven Knowles and Ronald Jason Palmieri try to defend the K rofft bifurcated test
and its allempt to clarify the role of the idea-expression dichotomy in determinations of
substantial similarity. See Knowles & Palmieri, supra note 9. In order to do so, how
ever, the authors modify what the court in fact held in K rofft. The authors argue that
there really is no distinction between an idea and its expression, id. at 124-29, and that
the first prong of the K rofft test is really a determination of whether there is objective
as opposed to subjective similarity between the expression used in the two works, id. at
132-34. The authors suggest that the court intended the use of a detailed, analytical
comparison of the expression in the two works to see if the defendant used too much of
tlie essential, original expression used by plaintiff. The authors describe this test as
applied to Romeo and juliet and West Side Story, indicating that by use of significant
expert analysis, the court would make this initial, quantitative conclusion. Only then
would a jury apply the subjective intrinsic test. /d. at 140, 153-66.
This is not, however, what the Ninth Circuit described in its opinion. The opinion
called for a separate, extrinsic comparison of ideas and then an intrinsic comparison of
expression. Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1164. Although the authors' approach is interesting, it
is not the approach described by the court in Krofft. Moreover, the author's approach
does not address the question of how the issue of copying would be determined, nor
does it provide a clear definition of where the line should be drawn in applying the first
test - the extrinsic or objective comparison of expression.
12 2 736 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1984 ).
120
121
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acters, and the mood of the works. All of these factors are arguably
elements of expression. Referring to the K rofft extrinsic test, the court
found no substantial similarity in ideas. 123 Thus, the court used expres
sion to compare the ideas and found them dissimilar. Consistent with
K rofft, the court nowhere indicated whether the insufficiency of the
similarities in ideas was relevant to the issue of copying or misappro
priation or both.
On the other hand, in Universal City Studio, Inc. v. J.A.R. Sales,
Inc., 124 the owners of the E. T. copyright sued the manufacturers of an
alien doll that they alleged infringed the copyright in the E. T. charac
ter. Again, the court applied the Krofft extrinsic test for similarity of
ideas, and this time found substantial similarity in ideas, i.e., the idea
of a creature from outer space. 125 Why the court considered these ab
stract ideas substantially similar in this case while not considering the
similarities in ideas between the Lokey play and E. T. substantial is un
clear. Perhaps the court's conclusions with respect to similarities in
ideas were influenced by the difference in expression of those ideas.
Perhaps the use of a substantially similar way of expressing the idea of
the alien is what made the court find the ideas similar in J.A.R.,
whereas in Litchfield, the differences in the way the aliens were de
picted and- in the stories told about them led the court to conclude that
these ideas were not similar. In fact, then, the first step in the K rofft
analysis, the extrinsic test for similar ideas, requires courts to compare
expression under the guise of comparing ideas. Thus it has not pro
vided any useful way for distinguishing unprotectable ideas from pro
tectable expression.

2.

The Intrinsic Test

The second step in the K rofft approach is also troublesome. The
Ninth Circuit held that after finding substantial similarity of ideas by
applying the extrinsic test, the courts should use the ordinary observer's
responses to evaluate intrinsically the similarities in expression. The
inquiry must be made without analysis, dissection, or expert testimony,
but rather must focus on the subjective question of whether the defend
ant took "so much of what is pleasing to the audience" to be held lia
ble.126 This is just a fanciful way of stating the old ordinary observer
123

See id. at 1356-57; see also 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 1, § 13.03[E], at 13-59
n.121.9.
124
1982 CoPYRIGHT L. REP. (CCH) 11 25,460 (C.D. Cal. 1982).
1 5
2 See id. at 17,743.
1 6
2 Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1164, 1165.
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test for substantial similarity. The courts in the Ninth Circuit, like
those elsewhere, have had problems applying this test. As in the other
jurisdictions, sometimes the courts applying K rofft seem to define "sub
stantial" by focusing on audience confusion, while at other times the
courts rely more on the value of what the defendant has taken.
For example, in the K rofft decision itself, the court focused on "the
impact of the respective works upon the minds and imaginations of
young people" 127 because these were works directed at children. The
court concluded: "We do not believe that the ordinary reasonable per
son, let alone a child, viewing these works will even notice that Pufn
stuf is wearing a cummerbund while Mayor McCheese is wearing a
diplomat's sash." 128 The principal concern in determining substantial
similarity was thus audience confusion. In many cases the courts make
this decision by simply comparing the "total concept and feel" of the
works. 129
By contrast, in Cooling Systems & Flexibles, Inc. v. Stuart Radia
tor, 130 when the plaintiff argued that the defendant's illustrated radiator
catalog was substantially similar to its catalog because the ordinary ob
server would find them "virtually indistinguishable," the court re
sponded by observing: "This misses the point. What is important is not
whether there is substantial similarity in the total concept and feel of
the works . . . but whether the very small amount of protectible [sic]
expression in Cooling System's catalog is substantially similar to the
equivalent portions of [the defendant's] catalog." 131 The Ninth Circuit
127

/d. at 1166.
/d. at 1167.
129
See, e.g., Litchfield, 736 F.2d 1352; Anderson v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 617
F. Supp. 1 (C.D. Cal. 1985) (screenplays not substantially similar); Overman v. Uni
versal City Studios, 1984 CoPYRIGHT L. Rt:P. (CCH) 11 25,660 (C.D. Cal. 1984)
(screenplays not substantially similar); Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Film Ventures
lnt'l, Inc., 543 F. Supp. 1134 (C.D. Cal. 1982) (screenplays substantially similar).
130 777 F.2d 485 (9th Cir. 1985).
131 /d. at 493 (citation omitted). Further, in Eisenman Chemical Co. v. NL Indus
tries, 595 F. Supp. 141, 146 (D. Nev. 1984), the court found defendant's training man
ual to be substantially similar to plaintifrs manual because a substantial portion of
defendant's manual, more than half, was "virtually verbatim" from plaintifrs manual.
As in Mikaelian, 571 F. Supp. 144, there is no indication in Eisenman as to how much
of plaintifrs expression had been taken, only how much of defendant's expression re
sulted from copying. The court was primarily concerned with the "[a]ppropriation of
another's labor and skill in order to publish a rival work," Eisenman, 595 F. Supp. at
146, and not with audience reaction to the "total concept and feel" of the two works.
Thus, in r:isenman the court seemed to be adopting the value approach to
misappropriation.
128
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modified the K rofft intrinsic test to take into consideration the type of
material allegedly infringed, recognizing that "the fewer the methods of
expressing an idea, the more the allegedly infringing work must resem
ble the copyrighted work in order to establish substantial similarity
• • • • " 132 The court never adequately explained, however, how the or
dinary observer eschewing dissection and analysis could make that
determination.
The K rofft test, then, fails to resolve any of the problems presented
by the traditional approach. The test does not isolate the issue of copy
ing from the issue of misappropriation; in fact, the two issues are not in
focus at all. The test still leaves defining the substantive meaning of
misappropriation to the unpredictable, undefined ordinary observer
test. The test still confusingly considers the extent of similarity both as
part of substantial similarity and as part of fair use. Even in the one
area that the Krofft test could have been potentially helpful -in sepa
rating the idea from the expression - its unexplained use of an extrin
sic test to compare the ideas in two works has led courts to define
"idea" broadly enough to include expression. Thus, courts dissect and
analyze that "expression" by labelling it an "idea." 133 The failure to
explain the basis of the two-step inquiry also has caused some to char
acterize as expression what arguably is simply unprotected idea. 134
Thus, the ordinary observer is still left poorly equipped to separate the
protected elements from the unprotected elements of the plaintifrs
work.
The K rofft test, the Salkeld test, and the traditional approach are all
seriously flawed because each relies on the concept of substantial simi
larity without placing that concept in a definite context in which the
courts can make objective and consistent determinations of whether the
degree of similarity between the works at issue is substantial. Each also
creates an inefficient and confusing overlap with the fair use doctrine.
m Cooling Sys., 777 F.2d at 49L
133 See, e.g., Litchfield, 736 F.2d at 1356-57 (sequence, dialogue, mood, and charac
ters compared under extrinsic test for similarity in ideas); Overman v. Universal City
Studios, 1984 CoPYRIGHT L. Rt:l'. (CCH), at 11 18,958 (plot, character, and tone com
pared under extrinsic test); Columbia Pictures Industries v. Embassy Pictures, 1982
CoPYRIGHT L. Rt:l'. (CCH) 11 25,440 (C.D. Cal. 1982) (plots compared as ideas under
extrinsic test).
134 In Litchfield, 736 F.2d at 1357, as part of its application of the intrinsic test for
similarity in expression, the court compared the themes of the two works, finding one
focused on the relationship between the alien and the boy while the other having as its
theme mankind divided by fear and hatred. It is arguably preferable to consider these
basic "themes" as underlying ideas and not as expression.
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NEW TEST

As we have seen, the real confusion in the various tests for infringe
ment begins when courts use substantial similarity to determine misap
propriation. This approach generates problems with distinguishing idea
from expression, and with deciding whether to focus on the value of
what was copied or on audience confusion. To reduce this confusion,
the courts should adopt a new approach to determining copyright
liability.

A.
1.

The New Approach Described

Proof of Copying

Under this new approach, a court would first decide if there are any
similarities between the works. If so, the court would ask whether those
similarities involve only ideas, or if they involve expression as well. The
court should not make any determinations based on the amount copied,
but should be focusing solely on the specific similarities between the
works, and whether they constitute ideas or expression.
At this point, the court should engage in the linedrawing described in
Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp. 135 For example, in considering two
stories about aliens stranded on earth or two crouching musclemen, the
court would determine if similarities exist beyond the basic idea in
each, and if those similarities fall on the idea or expression side of the
copyright dichotomy. This determination would depend in part on the
commonness of the elements at issue. Thus, a court might consider how
common it is to write about an alien who eats candy, or to emphasize
biceps in muscular figures. The determination would also depend on
whether protecting those elements - in this case candyeating aliens or
overdeveloped biceps - is consistent with copyright policy.l 36
135

45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930).
In fact, courts engage in this type of analysis in cases in which the defendant
moves for summary judgment, arguing that it has not copied any protectable elements
of the plaintiffs work. In cases in which courts conclude that no protected expression
appears in the defendant's work, the court properly enters judgment for the defendant,
obviating any need for considering the issues of copying or misappropriation. See, e.g.,
Eden Toys, Inc. v. Marshall Field & Co., 675 F.2d 498 (2d Cir. 1982) (summary
judgment for defendant upheld because two snowmen not substantially similar in ex
pression); Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972 (2d Cir.), cert. de
nied, 449 U.S. 841 (1 980) (historical interpretation concerning destruction of Hinden
burg in copyrighted work could be freely used by subsequent authors as it constituted
an uncopyrightable idea); Zambito v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 613 F. Supp. 1107
(E.D.N.Y. 1985) (screenplay not substantially similar to movie in expression); Pendle136
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If the court finds that any expression, even if just one line of prose,
for example, appears in· both works, then the trier of fact should next
determine only whether these similarities resulted from copying. In
other words, by looking at the universe of possible works and the extent
of similarity between the two works at issue, the trier of fact, with the
help of expert testimony, analysis, and dissection, will determine
whether concluding that the defendant created such similar expression
by copying from the plaintifrs work is reasonable.
The degree of similarity needed to support the inference of copying
will vary, depending on the type of work. For example, similarities in a
photograph of a famous subject need to be extremely numerous because
the universe of possible modes of expression is smaller, and thus the
likelihood of similar works being independently created is greater. 137
On the other hand, verbatim similarities between two literary works
need not be as extensive, since the chances that two people would
choose exactly the same words to express an idea are not as great. 138
Other similarities, such as similar errors, would also be probative of
copying. 139
ton v. /\cuff-Rose Publications, Inc., 605 F. Supp. 477 (M.D. Tenn. 1984) (summary
judgment for defendant when ideas, but not expression, of songs substantially similar).
See 3 M. NIMMt:R, supra note 1, § 12.1 0; see also Knowles & Palmieri, supra note 9,
at 126-31, 138-39 (proposing threshhold determination by court of whether any pro
tectable expression or only unprotected ideas appear in plaintifrs work).
137
For example, in Franklin Mint Corp. v. National Wildlife Art Exch., Inc., 575
F.2d 62, 65 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 880 (1978), the court, finding no copying
of the protected expression in the plaintifrs lifelike painting of a cardinal, observed:
[I]n the world of fine art, the ease with which a copyright may be delineated may depend on the artist's style. A painter like Monet when dwelling
upon impressions created by light on the facade of the Rouen Cathedral is
apt to create a work which can make infringement attempts difficult. On
the other hand, an artist who produces a rendition with photograph-like
clarity and accuracy may be hard pressed to prove unlawful copying by
another who uses the same subject matter and the same technique.
/d. at 65 (footnote omitted); see also Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian,
446 F.2d 738, 741 (9th Cir. 1971) (inference of copying plaintifrs copyrighted bee pin
"lost much of its strength because both pins were life like representations of a natural
creature"); cf. Gross v. Seligman, 212 F. 930 (2d Cir. 1914) (copying specific pose of
model with only insignificant changes infringed copyright in earlier photograph).
138 See, e.g., Adventures in Good Eating, Inc. v. Best Places to Eat, Inc., 131 F.2d
809, 811 (7th Cir. 1942) ("strikingly similar" phraseology used in defendant's restau
rant guide book supports inference of copying); Association of Am. Medical Colleges v.
Mikaelian, 571 F. Supp. 144 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (repeated exact similarities in test ques
tions can only be explained by copying).
139
See, e.g., Eckes v. Card Prices Update, 736 F.2d 859, 863-64 (2d Cir. 1984)
("numerous common errors" in defendant's and plaintifrs baseball card price guides
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In assessing the degree of similarity as evidence of copying, the trier
of fact would also continue to consider evidence of access. If there is
persuasive evidence of access and motive to copy, such as in Sid &
Marty Krofft Television v. McDonald's Corp., 140 in which the parties
had been negotiating the defendant's right to use the protected work,
then the degree of similarity between the works need not be over
whelming to find copying. However, if evidence of access is weak, such
as when the only evidence is some public distribution of the work, then
the degree of similarity needs to be more significant to infer copying. 141
If the works are strikingly similar, such as when they are nearly identi
cal or verbatim or when unique or highly unusual features appear in
each, then discussing access as a separate issue is not necessary. Rather,
it can be inferred from these similarities. 142
Thus, the issue of copying can be determined by an objective test
looking at evidence of access and substantial similarity in the context of
the type of works at issue. The use of substantial similarity for this
purpose appears valuable and workable.
2.

Justification of Copying: Fair Use

Establishing that copying of some protected expression has taken
place will make a prima facie showing of copyright infringement. The
burden should then shift to the defendant to justify that copying by
proving, under section 107 of the 197 6 Act, that that copying is a fair
use. Under this approach, the extensiveness of the similarities between
the two works would be considered part of the fair use analysis. Besupport inference of copying); Adventures in Good Eating, 131 F.2d at 811-12 (com
mon errors in telephone numbers and locations supports inference of copying of plain
tiffs restaurant guidebook); College Entrance Book Co. v. Amsco Book Co., 119 F.2d
874, 875 (2d Cir. 1941) (similar departure by defendant and plaintiff from custom of
using definite article before words beginning with consonants in French text books sup
ports inference of copying); see also 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 1, § 13.03[C].
140
562 F.2d 1157, 1161 (9th Cir. 1977); see also Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assoc.,
293 F. Supp. 130, 135-36 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (defendant tried to secure permission to use
plaintiffs copyrighted photographs).
141
See, e.g., Selle v. Gibb, 741 F.2d 896 (7th Cir. 1984) (no access found when song
performed and distributed to very limited extent); Scott v. WKJG, Inc., 376 F.2d 467
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 832 (1 967) (no access proven when play performed
only twice and only few copies distributed and no verbatim sentences appeared in de
fendant's work). See generally 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 1, § 13.02[A], at 13-13, 1314.
142
See, e.g., Heim v. Universal Pictures Co., 154 F.2d 480 (2d Cir. 1946) ("striking
similarity" between two song compositions); cf Selle, 741 F.2d 896. See generally 3 M.
NIMMER, supra note I, § 13.02[B].
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cause the new test would eliminate the misappropriation element of the
plaintifrs case, courts would only consider a subjective evaluation of the
degree of similarity between the two works in the context of fair use.
Thus, the undesirable duplication and overlap created by considering
the similarities both as part of the plaintifrs case and as part of the fair
use defense would be eliminated. 143
Some authors have proposed the opposite approach. For example, in Note, In
fringement, supra note 9, at 395-96, the author suggested that to avoid duplication,
courts should incorporate the fourth fair use factor, the effect of the use on the market
for or value of the copyrighted work, into the audience test for substantial similarity. In
other words, the ordinary observer test would be used to determine not simply audience
confusion, but displaced demand as a result of that confusion. Similarly, in Comment,
Fair Use, supra note 9, at 105-09, the author suggested that the effect on the demand
for the plaintifrs work be a factor considered as part of the plaintiffs case and not as
part of the fair use defense. In fact, the author argued that Congress should delete the
third and fourth factors, i.e., the amount and substantiality factor and the effect of the
use factor, from the fair use section of the then proposed bill for revision of the copy
right laws. The author concluded that fair use should be concerned only with the na
ture of the plaintiffs work and the purpose and character of the defendant's use, and
that the plaintiff should bear the burden of presenting and proving the substantiality of
use and the economic impact. Obviously, Congress disagreed with this approach, since
it enacted the third and fourth factors as part of 17 U.S.C. § 107 and its provisions
regarding determinations of fair use.
The Comment also argued that the plaintiff already bears the burden of proving
damages. Comment, Fair Use, supra note 9, at 106. The author suggested that since
proof of displaced demand would be an element in proving damages, it makes more
sense to have all this evidence presented as part of the plaintiffs case. /d. In those
instances in which displaced demand is an element in the plaintiffs proof of damages,
this allocation of the burdens might be more efficient. However, there are several flaws
in this argument. First, the plaintiff is not required to prove damages in order to obtain
recovery under the 1976 Copyright Revision Act. Section 504(b) provides the copyright
owner with the right to elect statutory damages in lieu of proof of actual damages and
profits. As this section's legislative history makes clear, "the plaintiff in an infringement
suit is not obliged to submit proof of damages and profits and may choose to rely on the
provision for minimum statutory damages." H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, supra note 5, at
161. Thus, if a plaintiff did not choose to seek actual damages and profits, the effi
ciency argument would not follow. Moreover, to impose a burden of proving economic
injury on the plaintiff in order to prove infringement when Congress has relieved the
plaintiff of such a burden would violate congressional intent.
From a broader perspective, it is generally more appropriate to put the burden of
proving the issue of economic impact on the defendant. Imposing such a burden on
copyright owners would undermine copyright policy. Copyright is not conditioned on
the proven economic or aesthetic value of a work. See, e.g., Bleistein v. Donaldson
Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1902) ("It would be a dangerous undertaking
for persons trained only to the law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of
pictorial illustrations, outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits."). A copy
righted work of little proven economic value might be copied without any provable
143
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The amount used would, however, be only one factor in determining
fair use. Courts would weigh and consider the other factors outlined in
section 107 in relation to the amount of the work that the defendant
has used. The factors under section 107 include: purpose and character
of the defendant's use, the nature of the copyrighted work, and the ef
fect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted
work. 144 Comparing two recent Supreme Court opinions reflecting ap
plication of the fair use doctrine illustrates how the amount used is a
variable In those determinations, not an isolated indicator of
infringement.

In Sony Corporation of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 145
the Court concluded that videotaping an entire copyrighted television
program for private viewing at a later time was a "fair use" of that
work. Despite assuming that the amount copied was the entire expres
sion included in the protected work, the Court reasoned that because
such use did not result in any significant negative impact on "the po
tential market for or value of the copyrighted work," it is a fair use. 146
On the other hand, in Harper & Row v. Nation Enterprises, 147 the
Court found that the defendant's use of only 300 verbatim words out of
a manuscript containing approximately 200,000 words was not a fair
use. Despite the relatively small amount of the protected work that the
defendant had used and the public interest in the material, the Court
held that because the plaintiff had not yet published its material and
economic injury. To deny that copyright owner any recovery because no actual injury
or displaced demand could be shown would be to deny in effect the value of the copy
right on that work. This would sneak in through the back door what Justice Holmes
cautioned against in Bleistein. See also Jochnowitz, Proof of Harm: A Dangerous Pre
requisite for Copyright Protection, 10 CoLUM. J.L. & ARTS 153 (1985) (requiring
proof of economic harm as prerequisite to recovery would be contrary to copyright
precedent as well as contrary to public policies underlying copyright law); Ladd, The
Harm of the Concept of Harm in Copyright, 30 J. CoPYRIGHT Soc'v U.S.A. 421, 422
(1983) (criticizing increasingly common tendency to view copyright as meant to "extend
no further than to what is financially indispensable to motivate creation and publica
tion" and arguing that purpose of copyright is not merely to reward authors, but to
promote marketplace of ideas and creative expression).
Moreover, placing the burden of proving economic injury on the plaintiff would not
necessarily encourage the articulation of reasoning that the fair use doctrine promotes.
The courts would still be able to reach decisions on the basis of the substantial similar
ity standards, with all its ambiguity and inconsistency, rather than identifying the real
factors in their decisions.
I« 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982).
145 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
146
/d. at 450-54.
147
471 u.s. 539 (1985).
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had suffered economic injury as a result of the defendant's use, there
was not fair use. 148 Hence, in one case an extensive use was considered
fair, whereas in the other the use of only a small amount was consid
ered unfair.
The fair use doctrine thus allows the courts to consider the substanti
ality of the use in a context in which other relevant factors are articu
lated. If the amount used is slight, but the use has serious impact on the
plaintiff and is not justified by. any social benefits, a court can find
liability. 149 However, if the amount used is great, but the use has little
impact on the market for the protected work, 150 or the nature of the
work and the defendant's use of that work make it socially desirable to
promote that use, 151 then a court can find fair use. Similarly, if the
amount copied is insubstantial and the impact insignificant, fair use
allows a court to save the defendant from liability, even though some
copying has occurred. 152
Critics may argue that applying the fair use doctrine will not make
determinations of copyright infringement any more predictable than us
ing the doctrine of substantial similarity. It may be suggested that like
the test of substantial similarity, the fair use test applies variable facts
to a nebulous legal standard. This assertion is at least partially true;
the use of the fair use doctrine would not make the line between liabilSee id. at 560-69.
See Iowa State Univ. v. American Broadcasting Cos., 621 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1980)
(no fair use when 8% of film used in way that usurped market for film); Roy Export
Co. Establishment v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 503 F. Supp. 1137 (S.D.N.Y.
1980), affd, 672 F.2d 1095 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 826 (1982) (no fair use
when defendant copied 75 seconds from the plaintiffs 72 minute film).
150 See, e.g., Sony, 464 U.S. 417; The Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487
F.2d 1345, 1354-55 (Ct. Cl. 1973), affd per curiam, 420 U.S. 376 (1975) (photocopy
ing entire articles is fair use in part because no showing of injury to copyright owners).
151 See, e.g., Williams & Wilkins, 487 F.2d at 1354 (photocopying medical journals
considered fair use in part because of purpose of promoting medical and scientific re
search); Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130, 146 (S.D.N.Y. 1968)
(copying plaintiffs photographs of Kennedy assassination considered fair use, given in
significance of injury and the "public interest in having the fullest information available
on the murder of President Kennedy").
152 See, e.g., Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. General Signal Corp., 724
F.2d 1044, 1050 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 823 (1984) (no showing of
likelihood of success on merits for plaintiff when defendant's use of 26 words out of
2100 in copyrighted article would not "usurp the demand for the [plaintiffs] original
work"); Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc., 626 F.2d
1171, 1177 (5th Cir. 1980) (fair use defense established when defendant used only
covers of plaintiffs magazines in way found not to have "any effect - other than
possibly de minimus - on the commercial value of the copyright").
148
149
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ity and nonliability absolute or precise. It would still require some eval
uation of the variables to predict the likelihood of a finding of copyright
infringement.
The difference, however, would be that in making that evaluation,
the specific factors that are appropriate to consider in determining fair
use are stated openly in the statute 153 and in the case law. 154 Courts
deciding the fair use issue are guided by the statute explicitly to con
sider the four section 107 factors, and the opinions thus reveal why a
certain use of copyrighted material is held to be actionable or not ac
tionable on the basis of those factors. 155 As we have seen, the courts
relying on substantial similarity do not necessarily articulate why the
standard has been met in some cases but not in others. 156 Thus, we
often do not know why such a determination was made in a particular
case. Adopting the fair use test would improve the degree of predict
ability, not by providing a precise standard, but by revealing the real
reasons underlying a decision so that parties and attorneys evaluating a
certain use of copyrighted material would know which uses are accept
able and why.

B.

The New Approach Applied

Returning to the toy cat hypothetical illustrates the benefits of this
approach. If we add to the description of the cats some other facts, we
can compare the results under the old approaches and the new propo
sal. For example, assume that the plaintiff is an independent craftsper
son who handmade the toy cats and sold close to two hundred of them
at crafts fairs in New England for $30 each in 1985. Assume that the
defendant is a major department store that has been selling its toy cats
since January 1986, for $25 each, in its branch stores throughout the
United States, including New England. Assume also that the defendant
employs buyers to travel to crafts fairs to locate possible new products.
17 U.S.C. § 107 (I 982).
E.g., Harper & Row v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539,560-69 (1985); Sony, 464
U.S. at 448-56.
l55 Compare, e.g., Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90, 96-100 (2d Cir.
1987) (applying and interpreting the four § I 07 factors in concluding that paraphras
ing of an author's unpublished letters in an unauthorized biography was not fair use)
with Maxtone-Graham v. Burtchaell, 803 F.2d 1253, 1260-64 (2d Cir. 1986) (applying
and interpreting the four § 107 factors in concluding that the copying of verbatim quo
tations from plaintiffs book was fair use); see also Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 560-69;
Sony, 464 U.S. at 448-56; Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Moral Majority, Inc., 796 F.2d
1148, 1151-56 (9th Cir. 1986).
156 See supra text accompanying notes 57-134.
153

154
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Given these facts, a court using the traditional approach would prob
ably be able to infer access from the defendant's practice of sending
buyers to crafts fairs. The court would then shift to the substantial
similarity test, using the visceral reactions of the ordinary observer as
its standard. Applying that standard, one court might conclude that the
toys are substantially similar because the color and fabric pattern give
the cats the same overall "touch and feel." A second court might find
them not to be substantially similar because the change in the gri~ eye
size, and head size give the toy a different facial expression. Finally, a
third court might agree with the second court as to overall "touch and
feel," but might conclude that the colors and fabric pattern were the
most valuable features and that the defendant had used those features
in a substantially similar way. The first and third courts would thus
find substantial similarity, whereas the second would not.
Unfortunately, this method of decision would not require courts to
explain their conclusions, nor would it allow us to know whether the
courts had remembered that the basic idea of a toy cat is not copyright
able. Moreover, courts would not be forced to consider the possibility of
independent creation by the defendant in spite of the likely exposure to
the plaintiffs work. As we have seen, neither the Salkeld approach nor
the Krofft approach would successfully resolve all these problems ei
ther, in large part because courts still ultimately determine liability on
the basis of "substantial similarity" without articulating any basis for
finding or not finding its presence. 157
In contrast, the proposed new approach would not allow the court to
mask its conclusions behind the label of substantial similarity. The
court would first identify the cats' similarities and determine whether
any are similarities in expression. Some of these similarities clearly go
beyond the basic unprotectable idea of a fabric-covered, stuffed toy cat.
The coloring and the fabric pattern used on the toy are similarities in
expression not dictated by the idea of a toy cat.
The court would then consider the likelihood that the defendant,
having had the opportunity to see the plaintiffs work, could have inde
pendently decided to use the same unusual colors and fabric pattern.
This determination would perhaps rest on expert testimony as to the
universe of possibilities and past and current practice. If the court con
cluded that the use of these colors and fabric patterns was copying, the
plaintiff would have successfully demonstrated that the copying was of
protected expression. Having proven the initial element of opportunity
157

See supra text accompanying notes 85-134.
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to see the work (access), and copying of protected expression (substan
tial similarity), the plaintiff would have established a prima facie case
of copyright infringement.
The burden would now shift to the defendant to justify that copying
as a fair use. The court would consider the extent of copying in terms
of the effect it would have on the plaintiff. In our hypothetical, this
impact could be devastating: the defendant is mass producing cheaper
cats and selling them in New England. If the defendant's cat is so much
like the plaintiffs cat as to supplant sales of the plaintiffs cat, the de
fendant could not establish fair use. If, however, the cats are different
enough that most buyers would still purchase plaintiffs handmade ver
sion, the defendant might establish fair use.
Tied in with these factors, however, could also be facts relating to
public interest or the defendant's good faith or charitable intentions.
For example, imagine the defendant were a craftsperson who hand
made the toy cats after seeing them at a plaintiff department store. If
the defendant then sold the cats for charitable purposes or gave them
away as gifts, the court might find fair use even though the similarities
between the toy cats were substantial enough to cause some consumers
to buy the defendant's cat instead of buying the plaintiffs copyrighted
version. In reaching these decisions, the court would consider the fac
tors defined in section 107, and would justify its conclusion by articu
lating how it weighed the factors.
Fair use in this way provides a mechanism for balancing the amount
of copying with other important factors. In contrast, the ambiguous and
confusing notions of substantial similarity allow the courts to use seem
ingly arbitrary lines, masking the real reasons for their decisions. Re
vealing the true basis for judicial decisions would provide a higher degree of predictability, integrity, and accountability.
·
CONCLUSION

The traditional approach to determining copyright infringement, and
the modifications thus far attempted, are all seriously inadequate. Each
relies in part on the concept of substantial similarity as determined by
the ordinary observer. As we have seen, this concept cannot be used
effectively to determine infringement because (1) it rejects the expert
testimony and analysis necessary to determine if copying can be in
ferred; (2) it tends to blur the line between unprotected idea and pro
tected expression; and (3) it does not define when similarity is substan
tial, i.e., do we use audience confusion or some other measure tied to
the value of the material being used? Despite years of trying to define
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and refine this concept of substantial similarity, it remains a confused,
ambiguous, and unhelpful concept which enables courts to obscure the
real reasons behind their decisions.
Courts should therefore adopt a new approach to determine copy
right infringement. Courts initially should consider as a matter of law
whether any protected expression appears in both works or only unpro
tected ideas. The plaintiff then should prove that the defendant has in
fact copied that expression. To do this the plaintiff should present evi
dence of access and of any similarities between the accused work and
the plaintiffs work. This evidence should be examined, dissected, and
analyzed to determine objectively whether it should be inferred that the
defendant copied from the plaintiff and did not create its work indepen
dently. If the defendant has copied some protected expression, the bur
den should then shift to the defendant to demonstrate fair use. The
amount copied is a factor to be considered, but only one factor. The
parties and the court should analyze thoroughly the question of fair
use, using all relevant factors and articulating how it weighed those
factors in reaching its decision.
Such an approach would preserve the integrity of the copyright laws
by providing a workable framework for deciding copyright cases.
Moreover, by deciding such cases in this way, the courts can avoid
strained and inconsistent results, and can better serve the public.
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